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CRIES AND WHISPERS: ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS,
MODEL RULE 1.6, AND THE ATTORNEY'S
CONFLICTING DUTIES TO CLIENTS AND OTHERS
Irma S. Russell'
Abstract: This Article explores the attorney's duty of confidentiality in the context of
environmental dangers, examining the history and purpose of the duty and the model ethical
rule that controls issues of confidentiality, Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct ("Model Rules"). Important scholarship has criticized Model Rule 1.6, but that
scholarship has not explored the effects of the Rule in the area where the stakes are highest:
environmental catastrophes. The Article analyzes the Rule's text, commentary, and
legislative history and discusses the two predominant views of the attorney in our society,
the attorney as champion and as officer of the court. Next, the Article considers these
conceptualizations of the attorney's role as they relate to the issue of confidentiality and
Rule 1.6, concluding that the view of the attorney as a champion pervades the Model Rules.
This Article contributes to the debate regarding Model Rule 1.6 by charting the Rule's
inexorable momentum toward silence and questioning the social utility of such silence when
a client's conduct threatens serious harm. The Article poses the issue of a domestic-Bhopal
as a way of contextualizing the duty and balance of considerations created by Model Rule
1.6. This catastrophic context is set not to argue for an environmental exception to the Rule
but rather to test the prohibition against disclosure in the extreme circumstance of
widespread harm. An environmental disaster presents cumulative harm and thus calls for
reassessment of the categorical nature of Rule 1.6. Although grave harm can result from
negligent or fraudulent conduct, and tort law may impose liability for creating these risks,
such considerations do not result in a viable exception under the ethical rule. Rule 1.6
includes an exception to the duty of silence when a client threatens criminal conduct likely
to result in serious harm to others. However, this exception fails to provide adequate
protection for third parties because the crime requirement derails consideration of the
threatened peril. Finally, the Article proposes substitute language for the Model Rule to
balance the dual risks of improvident disclosure and improvident silence.
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I. INTRODUCTION
You know that your client has created an environmen'tal danger that
threatens the community where you live-by a release or imminent
release of a toxic substance, for example. When you counsel your client
to report the danger, he refuses and threatens reprisals if you reveal
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anything.' Despite the threat of harm, the rules of ethics bind you to
remain silent if the danger arises from negligence rather than from a
criminal act.? This realistic nightmare presents a true moral dilemma3
and a tough problem of professional ethics.4 It provides context for
understanding the conflict between two compelling duties: (1) the duty
of the attorney to preserve the confidences and secrets of a client, and
(2) the moral duty to warn another of a significant threat.
Fulfilling one duty seems necessarily to result in a violation of the
other. This conflict is far from new. However, the gravity of the
consequences posed by a potential environmental catastrophe presents
the problem in a new context and challenges assumptions about the
appropriate balance between the two duties. Environmental hazards
provide a useful framework for evaluating Rule 1.6 not because they
deserve separate treatment but rather because they force evaluation of
the underlying assumptions of the absolute nature of the Rule. A
potential environmental catastrophe threatens an aggregate harm,
demanding consideration alongside the aggregate benefit of the duty of
1. "Virtually every American jurisdiction forbids attorneys to disclose client information. The
professional codes vary in their edicts, ranging from nearly absolute prohibitions on attorney
disclosures to general rules containing significant exceptions." Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking
Confidentiality, 74 Iowa L. Rev. 351,352 (1989).
2. Extensive environmental reporting requirements now mandate reporting discharges of
hazardous wastes. See, e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) (1994); 33 U.S.C. § 1342(aX2) (1994); 40 C.F.R.
§ 263.30 (1996) (implementing Resource Conservation and Recovery Act); see also Kathleen F.
Brickley, Environmental Crime at the Crossroads: The Intersection of Environmental and
Criminal Law Theory, 71 Tulane L. Rev. 487, 512 (1996) (describing self-reporting scheme
employed in federal environmental laws). Violation of such requirements can be a crime. See, e.g.,
33 U.S.C. § 319(c) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 7413(CX2Xa) (1994). The nightmare hypothetical set forth
here intentionally leaves uncertain the basis of a duty to disclose to focus on the issue of peril and
to reflect the uncertainty often present in cases of environmental hazards.
3. A dilemma is defined as "a situation requiring a choice between equally undesirable
alternatives!' The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 411 (college ed. 1968).
4. Scholars have questioned the efficacy of the professional codes of lawyers.
What are the ethical priorities of the legal profession? Do the codes of ethics and
miscellaneous rulings by which lawyers order their professional lives have anything to do with
the presumptive moral concerns of the average citizen for fairness, justice and truth-seeking?
Or does the rubric "legal ethics" comprise, rather a collection of arcane rules and restrictions
well designed to promote ultimately the pecuniary interests of the legal profession through
narrow pursuit of adversary advantage and monopolistic control of services?
John Lorentz, Conscience, Conduct, and the Bar: The Formal and Informal Opinions of the A.B.A.
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility 1924-1976, at 1 (1979); see also David S.
Caudill, Sympathy for the Devil?: Reflections on the Crime-Fraud Exception to Client
Confidentiality, 8 St. John's J. Legal Comment. 369 (1993) (considering tension between
constructive and actual ethics); Max Radin, The Ancient Grudge: A Study of the Public Relations of
the Legal Profession, 32 Va. L. Rev. 734 (1946).
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confidentiality to society and the legal system.5 Moreover, changes in
tort law, including the abrogation of the bar of privity and the emergence
of a duty to warn, challenge the concepts of professionalism that
undergird the Model Rules.
Like all attorneys,6 mental health professionals,7 and many other
professionals,' lawyers engaged in environmental practice have a duty to
maintain the confidences and secrets of their clients. 9 The current
standard of confidentiality enunciated by the American Bar Association
(ABA) is set forth in Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct ("Model Rules"). The duty to third parties may be imposed by
statute," the common law,'2 or by the conscience of the lawyer. 3
5. An alternative analysis compares the risks associated with both silence and disclosure.
6. The ethical rules of a jurisdiction are generally held to apply to in-house corporate counsel
and counsel representing organizations as well as attorneys in private practice. See Model Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 1.13 cmt. 3 (1994); Tenn. Supreme Court Bd. of Professional
Responsibility, Formal Op. 83-F-52 (1983).
7. See, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1924 (1996) (recognizing psychotherapist
privilege based on need for confidential communications for successful treatment and to serve
public interest by enhancing "mental health of the Nation's citizenry").
8. See Canfield v. Sandock, 563 N.E.2d 526 (Ind. 1990) (recognizing physician-patient privilege
by holding documents not subject to discovery); Sissela Bok, Secrets: On the Ethics of
Concealment and Revelation 116 (1982) ("Doctors, lawyers, and priests have traditionally
recognized the duty of professional secrecy regarding what individuals confide to them: personal
matters... that patients or clients want to share with someone, yet keep from a11 others."); see also
Robert I. Field, Overview: Computerized Medical Records Create New Legal and Business
Cotfldentiality Problems, HealthSpan, Sept. 1994, at 3, 4 (noting that when taking Hippocratic
oath, physician declares "[w]hatever in connection with my professional practice or not in
connection with it I see or hear in the life of men which ought not to be spoken abroad I will not
divulge as recommending that all such should be kept secret").
9. A lawyer is bound to preserve the confidences and secrets of the client in addition to
exercising skill and knowledge in serving the client's cause. See Model Riles of Professional
Conduct Rule 1.6 (1994); Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 4-101.(1980).
10. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6. Although 39 jurisdictions have adopted the
Model Rules, only seven states did so without modification. See infra Part IV.
11. See, e.g., CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9603 (1994) (reporting requirements). Most environmental
statutes require the owner or operator who has caused a release of a hazardous substance to report
the release to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or to the state agency authorized to
regulate the substance involved. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a). Statutes may state a duty to protect
or restore the environment but leave the resolution of liability to the common law. See, e.g., 42
U.S.C. § 7412 (1994) (refusing to create basis for liability for "compensation for bodily injury or
any other injury or property damages to any person which may result from accidental releases");
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1994) (creating liability for cleaning up hazardous waste site but
leaving liability for personal injury to common law). Statutes can place the responsibility of
reporting on "any person" having knowledge of the condition. See N.J. Stat. Arn. § 58:1OA-21 to -
37 (West 1990) (New Jersey Underground Storage Tank Act); see also J. Randolph Evans & Ida
Patterson Dorvee, Attorney Liability For Assisting Clients with Wrongful Conduct: Established and
Emerging Bases of Liability, 45 S.C. L. Rev. 803 (1994); Hazardous Advice: Lawyer, Firm
Prosecuted for Telling Client Not to Clean Up Waste, ABA J., Sept. 1991, at 16, 16 (discussing
412
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Each of these duties is other-regarding in that each seeks to further
societal goals rather than to advance advancing isolated interests of
particular groups or individuals. Environmental laws, including
requirements that hazardous releases be reported, are predicated on a
legislative judgment that they are necessary to protect the health of
members of society and the environment upon which society depends.
Likewise, the duty of confidentiality serves more than the individual
client. It serves the system of justice as a whole by providing
confidentiality to all individuals in need of representation,14 enhancing
the adequacy of representation, and encouraging clients to comply with
the law.'5 Similarly, in protecting the autonomy of the individual client, 6
the attorney serves the cumulative good, providing protection to clients
in the aggregate. 7
When an attorney knows of a significant environmental danger
created by a client 8 who refuses to report or correct the condition, which
felony charges filed against eight attorneys on theory that letter abandoning their client's laboratory
constituted illegal disposal of hazardous wastes).
12. See W. Probert & R. Hendricks, Lawyer Malpractice: Duty Relationships Beyond Contract,
55 Notre Dame L. Rev. 708 (1980).
13. Both the Model Rules'and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility refer lawyers to
conscience for the process of resolving conflicts. See Center for Prof I Responsibility, American
Bar Ass'n, The Legislative History of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Their Development
In the ABA House of Delegates 12 (1987) [hereinafter Legislative History]; Model Code of
Professional Responsibility pmbl. (1983) ("Each lawyer must find within his own conscience the
touchstone against which to test the extent to which his actions should rise above minimum
standards.").
14. See 1 Edward M. Thornton, A Treatise on Attorneys at Law 159 (1914). As Thorton
explains:
The idea that seems to be involved in [the rule's] establishment is not that of mere secrecy....
[I]t is founded on altogether a different principle. Having respect solely to the free and
unembarrassed administration of justice, and to the security of all men in the enjoyment of
their civil rights ....
ICE
15. The Model Rules do not, of course, go so far as to condone perjury or to allow the attorney
to aid a violation of the law. The argument set forth in Part III is that, although the duty of
confidentiality is intended to serve social utility, the ABA's most recent enunciation of the duty
creates a categorical imperative of attorney silence, merging the identity of this subsidiary good
(confidentiality) with the absolute of social utility.
16. For a discussion of the attorney's role in enhancing client autonomy, see Monroe Freedman,
Professionalism in the American Adversary System, 41 Emory L.J. 467 (1992).
17. Id. at 471.
18. When the client is a corporation, the attorney has an obligation to seek a hearing on the
problem at higher levels of the corporation when intermediate officials refuse to comply with the
law. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.13 (1994). The introductory nightmare
scenario assumes that the official with ultimate authority has decided to continue the disputed
conduct that creates a risk of harm.
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duty should predominate-the duty to maintain the confidences of the
client or the duty to avert a danger to the community or an individual? A
variety of factors exacerbate this dilemma for attorneys, including the
growing risk of tort liability for professionals who fail to warn non-
clients of dangers'9 and the ambiguity of many environmental laws.2"
Thus, an attorney may be caught in a "Catch-22"' situation in which she
is forced to choose between revealing information agaist a client's
wishes or facing potential tort claims from those injured by the client's
activities.'
This dilemma is not farfetched. "Chemical accidents with serious
effects have become commonplace in the United States."' Although the
United States has not experienced the kind of catastrophe that befell the
thousands of people killed or injured by a chemical release from a Union
Carbide plant in Bhopal, India,2' the United States has narrowly escaped
19. See generally Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal Malpractice (3d ed. 1989); Mary
P. Ellis, Attorney Liability to Non-Clients, 17 Colo. Law. 1537 (1988); Donald B. Hilliker,
Attorney Liability to Third Parties: A Look to the Future, 36 DePaul L. Rev. 41 (1986); Marc I.
Steinberg, Attorney Liability Under Securities Laws, 45 Sw. L.J. 711 (1991).
20. Additionally, criminal sanctions apply to a knowing failure to disclose violations of
environmental laws, heightening both the significance of compliance and the need for accurate
judgments by attorneys concerning whether information is confidential. Numerous enforcement
actions are lodged each year by the EPA, citizen groups, and state and federal prosecutors. See,
e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a) (1994) (providing civil and criminal penalties for commercial use of
certain toxic substances); 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1994) (establishing criminal penalties for those who
pollute navigable waters); 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c) (1994).
21. "Catch 22" is defined as "a paradox in a law, regulation, or practice that makes one a victim
of its provisions no matter what one does." Webster's New World Dictionary 224 (2d college ed.
1980). The term was made popular by Joseph Heller's novel of the same name. See Joseph Heller,
Catch-22 (1961).
22. Attorneys have legitimate concerns about potential tort liability to non-clients as well as to
clients. See, e.g., Jonathan J. De Jong, Attorney Liability to Third Party Non-Clients, 5 Kan. J.L. &
Pub. Pol'y 161 (1995); Marc I. Steinberg, Attorney Liability for Client Fraud, 1991 Colum. Bus. L.
Rev. 1. An attorney may face liability for failing to disclose information when he has personal
knowledge of dangers or information sought by agencies. See Robert G. Day, Administrative
Watchdogs or Zealous Advocates? Implications for Legal Ethics in the Face of Expanded Attorney
Liability, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 645, 669-70 (1993); see also Brian W. Smith & M. Lindsay Childress,
Avoiding Lawyer Liability in the Wake of Kaye, Scholer, 8 St. John's J. Legal Comment. 385
(1993); Steinberg, supra note 19, at 711.
23. S. Rep. No. 101-228, at 134 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3519; see also
Bradford C. Mank, Preventing Bhopal: "Dead Zones" and Toxic Death Risks Index Taxes, 53 Ohio
St. L.J. 761, 761 (1992) (arguing that government should "encourage industry to substitute less
harmful chemicals or store smaller quantities of toxic materials"); Pesticides: Chemical Firms
Agree To Pay $21 Million Toward Cleanup of Fresno's Drinking Water, 10 Toxics L. Reptr.
(BNA) 9 (June 7, 1995).
24. See Anniversary of a Tragedy (Bhopal, India Death Gas Leak), Time, Dec. 16, 1985, at 42,
42; Bhopal Gas Leak Is Still Causing Illness in India, Baltimore Sun, Dec. 18, 1996, at 19A; Worst
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catastrophes more dire-without significant publicity about these near
misses.' According to a study by the EPA, between 1982 and 1986,
seventeen accidental chemical releases within U.S. borders would have
resulted in consequences as catastrophic as Bhopal but for the location
of the plants and favorable conditions.
In the scenario set forth above, the applicable rule of ethics of the
ABA model27 appears to allow an attorney to remain silent despite
significant danger to the public or to an individual.28 The central thesis
of this Article is that society has a critical interest in the balance struck
between these conflicting duties and in encouraging lawyers to assess
environmental dangers rather than blindly adhering to an ethic of
silence. The Article assesses the operation of Model Rule 1.6 in light of
environmental catastrophes and concludes that the realities of
environmental dangers demand reassessment of the ABA rule on
confidentiality. 9
Is To Come With Bhopal Gas Leak; Official Says, News Trib. (Tacoma, Wash.), Dec. 18, 1996, at
A12.
25. S. Rep. No. 101-228, at 134 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3519-20.
26. Ia at 134-35. As the Senate Report explained:
In response to Bhopal, the Environmental Protection Agency began several efforts to
determine the scope of the chemical accident problem including compilation of an "Acute
Hazardous Events Data Base" (AHE/DB) .... In August of 1988 EPA prepared an update
(which was released on April 8, 1989) covering 11,048 events in the United States involving
the accidental release of extremely hazardous substances between 1982 and 1986. These
[American] events caused 309 deaths, 11,341 injuries and the evacuation of 464,677 people
from homes and jobs....
... EPA analyzed 29 events with the highest potential for damage to health and the
environment. These events were compared to the release at Bhopal, India which killed 3,000
and injured over 200,000. Considering only the toxicity and volume of the chemicals released
in the 29 U.S. events, 17 of these events had the potential for more damage than Bhopal and all
29 had a potential of 50 percent or more of the Bhopal effects. That few were killed or injured
in these accidents (650 people were injured in one event and 5 killed in another) is due
principally to the location of the facilities and climate and operating conditions at the time of
the release.
Id
27. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (1994).
28. Although the Rules prohibit disclosure generally, they do permit disclosure "to the extent the
lawyer reasonably believes necessary: (1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that
the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm." Rule 1.6(bXl).
Even then, the Rule does not require or encourage disclosure. Rule 1.6(bXl). Positive law may
require disclosure of a hazardous release. Whether such a mandate of statutory law requires the
attorney to disclose the release depends on the scope and intent of the statute.
29. An ethic of silence is memorialized in the current rules of professional ethics governing
lawyers. Though there are variations in the rules, most jurisdictions have adopted the Model Rules
415
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Part II of this Article recounts the history and purpose of the duty of
confidentiality. Part III examines the text, commentary, 0 and legislative
history of Model Rule 1.6. Part IV discusses modifications to Rule 1.6
by states that have adopted the Model Rules. Part V examines two
predominant views of the attorney (as champion and as officer of the
court) as they relate to the issue of confidentiality. Part VI assesses Rule
1.6 in light of these conceptualizations of the attorney's role, concluding
that the model of the attorney-champion pervades the Model Rules. Part
VII surveys the interaction between the ethical rules and environmental
dangers. Finally, Part VIII suggests a reconceptualization of Rule 1.6 to
weigh the risks of attorney silence against the risks of attorney
disclosure.
II. HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE DUTY OF
CONFIDENTIALITY
The duty of confidentiality has been said to be "an expression of the
agent's duty to protect the principal's interests."' The colacept may be a
necessary adjunct to established principles, such as the attorney's duty
of loyalty to the client 2 and the need for the free flow of information
between clients and attorneys.3 Moreover, the duty is integral to the
client's personal autonomy. 4 Disclosures that may not be compelled
which includes a statement that an attorney's decision to remain silent is not a violation of the rule
on confidentiality. See Rule 1.6 cmt. 13.
30. "Commentary" includes the comments, the Preamble, and the Scope section of the Model
Rules.
31. See Robert H. Aronson et al., Professional Responsibility: Problems, Cases, and Materials
222 (2d ed. 1995). Of course the duty is also tied closely to the evidentiary privilege against
disclosure of client confidences. Id.; see also 1 Thorton, supra note 14, at 158-60. Thorton devoted
a chapter of his treatise to the topic of "Privileged Communications," including within the chapter
both evidentiary issues and the general rule against disclosure. See idl at 153-227.
32. See Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics § 6.7.3, at 301 (1986). For a fuller treatment
of the history of the duty of confidentiality, see Harry I. Subin, The Lawyer as Superego:
Disclosure of Client Confidences to Prevent Harm, 70 Iowa L. Rev. 1091 (1985).
33. See Wolfram, supra note 32, § 6.7.3, at 300; see also 1 Thornton, supra note 14, at 162
(noting that "some courts favor a liberal construction [of the Rule] on the theory that one
consulting a lawyer should be encouraged to communicate all the facts without fear that his
statements may possibly be used against him in the future").
34. The principle of confidentiality "creates a zone of privacy that cannot be breached by a too-
inquisitive government, and thus enhances the autonomy and individual liberty of citizens." See
1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law ofLawyering: A Handbook on the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct § 1.6:101, at 120.1 (Supp. 1977). Observing that the duty of
confidentiality "is founded on altogether a different principle" than "mere secrecy," Thornton
traced the duty of confidentiality to the personal right of an individual litigant.
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from a defendant under the privilege against self incrimination should
not be compelled from the defendant's attorney. 5 On the other hand, the
duty of confidentiality traditionally has not been viewed as an absolute.36
The duty does not require an attorney to assist a client's fraud or to
allow it to go unpunished. 7
Counsel's duty of loyalty to, and advocacy of, the defendant's
cause is limited to legitimate, lawful conduct compatible with the
very nature of a trial as a search for truth. Although counsel must
take all reasonable lawful means to attain his client's objectives,
counsel is precluded from taking steps or in any way assisting the
client in presenting false evidence or otherwise violating the law.38
The ABA's first statement of the duty of confidentiality appeared in
Canon 37 of the Canons of Professional Ethics. It provided, "It is the
[N]o man is under a legal obligation to disclose facts or circumstances which would render
questionable his demand for a particular right, or impair his defense to another's demand.
Originally, suitors and defendants appeared personally before the tribunal which interpreted
and administered the law. Subsequently... the procurement of the services of persons skilled
in the law became universal. No man being compelled himself to disclose the weakness of his
case, it followed, almost as a necessary consequence, that the person who represented him, and
presented that case, could not do so. If it were otherwise, the free administration of justice
would be restricted, and the ascertainment and enforcement of rights endangered.
1 Thornton, supra note 14, at 159-60.
35. See Fisher v. Unites States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976); see also David J. Fried, Too High a Price
for Truth: The Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege for Contemplated Crimes and Frauds, 64
N.C. L. Rev. 443 (1986). As Fried explains:
There is little moral difference between convicting a client by testimony compelled from his or
her own mouth and convicting a client by testimony compelled from his or her attorney's
mouth. This view may be called the "intrinsic value" theory of the privilege. It is probably the
view held by most working attorneys.
Id. at 492.
36. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986) (holding that trial lawyer's admonition to
defendant not to commit perjury and threat to withdraw and disclose false testimony did not deny
defendant constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel); see also I Hazard, Jr. & Hodes,
supra note 34, § 1.6:109, at 168.1 (Supp. 1996) (noting that duty has never been regarded as
"unqualified rule"); Wolfram, supra 32, § 6.1, at 245 (noting that privacy justifications do not
justify "an unqualified privilege").
37. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.2 (1994). Additionally,
[w]hen a lawyer discovers that some fraud or deception has been practiced, which has unjustly
imposed upon the court or a party, he should endeavor to rectify it; at first by advising his
client, and if his client refuses to forego the advantage thus unjustly gained, he should
promptly inform the injured person or his counsel, so that they may take appropriate steps.
Canons of Professional Ethics Canon 41 (1908).
38. Nix, 475 U.S. at 158.
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duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's confidences."39 This Canon
excluded a client's intended crime from the definition of confidences:
the "announced intention of a client to commit a crime is not included
within the confidences which [an attorney] is bound to respect.' '
In 1969 the ABA superseded the Canons4' by its adoption of the Code
ofProfessional Responsibility.42 Under the Code, the duty encompasses43
client confidences and secrets." It is a violation of the Code for a lawyer
to use or to reveal such information.45 The Code allows disclosures
39. Canons of Professional Ethics Canon 37 (1908). The ABA adopted the Canons of
Professional Ethics at its annual meeting on August 27, 1908, declaring that "the stability of the
Courts and of all departments of government rests upon the approval of the people." Center for
Prof'l Responsibility, American Bar Ass'n, Model Rules of Professional Conduct vii (3d ed. 1993).
40. Canons of Professional Ethics Canon 37. Further, the text of Canon 37 allowed disclosures
that "may be necessary to prevent the act [crime] or to protect those against whom it is threatened.'
Canon 37; see also ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Fonnal Op. 154 (1936).
Other provisions of the Canons dealt with questions related to the dut of confidentiality,
moderating the duty to the client with duties to others and society at large. See, e.g., Canons of
Professional Ethics, Canon 15 ("How Far a Lawyer May Go in Supporting a Client's Cause");
Canon 16 ("Restraining Client from Improprieties"); Canon 22 ("Candor and Frankness") (1908);
see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 Yale LJ. 1239, 1247 (1991)
(noting that Canons handled client crime or fraud "in complicated and perhaps equivocal terms").
41. See Wolfram, supra note 32, app. B, at 1021.
42 In 1978 the ABA added the designation "Model" to the title of the Code in compliance with
a settlement agreement it entered with the Justice Department to resolve antitrust charges. See
Wolfram, supra note 32, § 2.6, at 57.
43. Although the Code was later superseded by the Model Rules, see infra text accompanying
note 49, the present tense is used here because the Model Code continues in force in roughly one-
fifth of the states. At this writing, the following states follow the Model Code in defining attorney-
client confidentiality: Georgia, Ga. Code of Professional Responsibility DR 4-101 (1996); Iowa,
Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility DR 4-101 (1996); Massachusetts, Mass. Canons of
Ethics DR 4-101 (1996); Nebraska, Neb. Code of Professional Responsibility DR 4-101 (West
1995); New York, N.Y. Code of Professional Responsibility DR 4-101 (1995); Ohio, Ohio Code of
Professional Responsibility DR 4-101 (Banks-Baldwin 1996); Oregon, Or. Code of Professional
Responsibility DR 4-101 (1996); Tennessee, Tenn. Code of Professional Responsibility DR 4-101
(1995); Vermont, Vt. Code of Professional Responsibility DR 4-101 (1995); and Virginia, Va. Code
of Professional Responsibility DR 4-101 (1996). Vermont, however, is considering adoption of the
Model Rules. See generally A. Jeffry Taylor, Essay, Work in Progress: The Vermont Rules of
Professional Conduct, 20 Vt. L. Rev. 901 (1996).
44. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 4-101 (1980). Disciplinary Rule 4-101 of
the Code defines client confidences and secrets and prohibits attorneys from disclosing either
except in specified instances. It defines "confidences" as "information protected by the attorney-
client privilege under applicable law" and "secret" as "other information gained in the professional
relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would likely
be embarrassing or detrimental to the client." See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 4-
101(A).
45. See Model Code ofProfessional Responsibility DR 4-101(B).
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permitted by the Disciplinary Rules,' or required by law or court
order.47 It also permits an attorney to reveal "the intention of his client to
commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime."'48
In 1983, after lengthy study and debate,49 the ABA adopted the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct. The Model Rules provide the current
statement of the ethical obligations of attorneys by the leading
professional association for lawyers in the United States, the ABA.
IH. MODEL RULE 1.6
Model Rule 1.6 is the ABA's current statement of the attorney's duty
of confidentiality. Although thirty-nine jurisdictions have adopted the
Model Rules," only a handful of those states accepted Rule 1.6 in
unaltered form."l This part of the Article studies the text and comments
of Rule 1.6 and concludes that although the Rule speaks in terms of
balancing the interests of the client, the attorney, and others, the
46. The first exception requires balancing the duty of confidentiality against other professional
duties, permitting the attorney to reveal a confidence when another section of the Code would
allow the revelation. See, e.g., Model Code DR 4-101.
47. Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 4-101(CX2). The exception for disclosures
"required by law" creates some uncertainties. It seems to include statutory mandates such as
reporting requirements of environmental releases or hazards in addition to duties arising from tort
law. See 1 Hazard, Jr. & Hodes, supra note 34, § 1.6:113, at 168.9 (Supp. 1996) (noting that
attorney "may take the view that he is required by 'law,' namely tort law or criminal law, to
disclose preemptively client misdeeds in which the lawyer's services were used"). In the
environmental arena, uncertainties of application abound. Statutes are often less than clear
regarding the intended reach of the law creating reporting requirements. For example, CERCLA,
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994), provides that "any person" may be required to furnish information
to an officer, employee, or representative of the President. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(eX2) (1994)
(emphasis added). Additionally, CERCLA's mandate that those in charge of a facility report a
release of a hazardous substance reaches fairly low-ranking employees. See United States v. Carr,
880 F.2d 1550 (2d Cir. 1989) (interpreting CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9603 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
48. Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 4-101(CX3). The provision does not qualify
the type of crime justifying disclosure. Model Code DR 4-101(CX3); see Stephen Gillers & Roy D.
Simon, Jr., Regulation of Lawyers: Statutes and Standards 55 (1995).
49. The process began in 1977 when the President of the ABA appointed Robert J. Kutak to be
chair of the Kutak Commission. See Gillers & Simon, Jr., supra note 48, at ix. The Commission
drafted Proposed Rules, which were debated and modified in sessions of the ABA House of
Delegates of the Association and ultimately adopted on August 2, 1983. L
50. See infra note 172. Many jurisdictions have modified the Model Rules, especially Rule 1.6.
See infra notes 180-189 and accompanying text.
51. See infra note 173. Uniformity among the states is particularly important with regard to the
duty of confidentiality because the purpose of the rule is to communicate the standard to the public
so that clients will feel confident in seeking representation and communicating openly with
attorneys. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 cmt. 4 (1994).
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momentum of the Rule results in a categorical imperative52 or absolute
rule of nondisclosure of client information."
Model Rule 1.6 provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation
of a client unless the client consents after consultation, except for
disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
representation, and except as stated in paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that
the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or
substantial bodily harm; or
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a
controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a
defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer
based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to
respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the
lawyer's representation of the client.54
Rule 1.6, the most debated rule before the ABA Commission,"
continues to generate controversy today.56 As finally adopted, Rule 1.6
enhances the ethic of attorney silence by expanding the universe of
information within the duty of confidentiality, contracting the exceptions
to the rule, and deleting any reference to positive law.
The central place of the duty of confidentiality is clear before one
reads Rule 1.6. The Preamble to the Model Rules highlights the
52. Others have noted the categorical nature of the duty. See, e.g., Albert Alschuler, The
Preservation of a Client's Confidences: One Value Among Many or a Categorical Imperative? 52
U. Colo. L. Rev. 349 (1981); Subin, supra note 32, at 1180.
53. This Article does not criticize the recognized duty to maintain the confidentiality of past
actions when the consequences of those actions are complete. Rather, the Article assesses the duty
of confidentiality as it relates to future peril for others. Likewise, the question of attorney sanctions
under the Rule is beyond the scope of this Article.
54. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6.
55. See Robert H. Aronson, Washington Survey: An Overview of the Law of Professional
Responsibility: The Rules of Professional Conduct Annotated and Analyzed, 61 Wash. L. Rev. 823
(1986); Robert A. Burt, Conflict and Trust Between Attorney and Client, 69 Geo. L.J. 1015, 1017
(1981); Hazard, Jr., supra note 40; Robert P. Lawry, The Central Moral Tradition ofLavyering, 19
Hofstra L. Rev. 311 (1990).
56. Aronson, supra note 55, at 831 (pairing Rule 1.6 with 3.3 as "most cortroversial" and "least
justifiable" of Model Rules).
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importance of confidentiality and underscores the prohibition: "A lawyer
should keep in confidence information relating to representation of a
client except so far as disclosure is required or permitted by the Rules of
Professional Conduct or other law.""7 Like earlier statements of the duty
of confidentiality, the Model Rules indicate that the primary goal of Rule
1.6 is to encourage clients to tell their attorney all facts relating to the
representation. s A second goal is to encourage people to seek
representation as early as possible.59 The Model Rules assume that
without a strong ethic of silence clients will not share important
information with their attorneys.6' This assumption, that lawyers must
assure clients of confidentiality in order to obtain necessary information
to represent them, has been challenged.6
The Rule's justification for the standard set for confidentiality is
based on society's best interest. The duty is endorsed as serving the dual
purposes of providing the individual client with full representation and
of protecting the public by giving the attorney information necessary to
dissuade the client from unlawful conduct likely to result in serious
harm. Comment 3 to Rule 1.6 states, "Based upon experience, lawyers
know that almost all clients, follow the advice given, and the law is
upheld."6' 2 Of course securing these benefits requires that potential
clients (the public) understand the protection afforded by the rule;6'
57. Legislative History, supra note 13, at 12. The Preamble also acknowledges the importance of
conscience in a lawyer's decision-making: "Many of a lawyer's professional responsibilities are
prescribed in the Rules of Professional Conduct, as well as substantive and procedural law.
However, a lawyer is also guided by personal conscience and the approbation of professional
peers." l
58. Comment 4 to Rule 1.6 states that the purpose of the Rule is to encourage clients to
"communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally damaging
subject matter." Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 cmt. 4. In arguing for deletion of
the exception for fraudulent conduct likely to injure another, the consensus of the discussion of the
ABA House of Delegates was that such an amendment "would encourage fuller and franker
communication between a lawyer and client by narrowing the circumstances in which the lawyer
could disclose client confidences." See Legislative History, supra note 13, at 48.
59. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 cmt. 2 (stating that Rule 1.6 "not only
facilitates the full development of facts essential to proper representation of the client but also
encourages people to seek early legal representation"); see also Tenn. Supreme Court Bd. of
Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. No. 85-F-99 (1985).
60. Zacharias, supra note 1, at 352-53 ("The rules stem from common assumptions about our
legal system: clients won't confide in lawyers without confidentiality; lawyers need it to represent
clients effectively.").
61. See Wolfram, supra note 32, § 6.1.3, at 243 (1986) (noting absence of data to support
assumption in context of attomey-client privilege).
62. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 cmt. 3.
63. This goal creates a need for an understandable and uniform rule of confidentiality.
Otherwise, the potential client will be unable to have confidence that his expectation of privacy
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otherwise, the public will not be persuaded to seek legal advice and to
disclose all relevant information to attorneys. Although the Rule may be
tempered by other provisions of the Model Rules," it advocates attorney
silence in virtually all circumstances." While the Rule does not state or
assume that the attorney will be successful in dissuading the client from
harmful conduct in every case, it justifies the mandate of silence on the
basis of effective counseling in most.' In a world where harmful
conduct is directed against individuals rather than the community or the
nation at large, this system may seem to have utilitarian appeal. When
widespread death and harm are possible (as a result of negligent
handling of chemical or nuclear substances, for example) the danger of
this balance becomes clear.
A. The Structure of the Rule
1. Scope: Use of the Term "'Information"
The broad reach of Rule 1.667 heightens the concern for social utility
in the face of dangers. The final version of the new rule rejected the
terms "confidences and secrets" used in the Model Coded5' in favor of the
will be carried out. Ambiguous rules or ones that vary from state to state will discourage potential
clients. Currently, the public seems not to have a clear understanding of the duty of confidentiality
and its exceptions. See Zacharias, supra note 1, at 394 (reporting survey results indicating
"widespread misunderstanding of confidentiality... among clients").
64. These include Rule 2.2 ("Intermediary"), Rule 3.3 ("Candor Toward the Tribunal"), and
Rule 4.1 ("Truthfulness in Statements to Others"). See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rules
2.2, 3.3, 4.1 (1994). In a recent disciplinary hearing, the ABA Committee concluded that the
lawyer's responsibility to disclose client perjury to the tribunal supersedec. the lawyer's duty of
confidentiality. See generally Evans & Dorvee, supra note 11.
65. Although the Preamble to the Model Rules notes the preeminence of positive law, the
momentum of Rule 1.6 seems to encourage silence without regard to dangers to third parties.
66. Although the duty of confidentiality has been traditionally justified by the need for
representation of the individual and recognition of the autonomy of each person, the Model Rules'
primary response to concerns about harm to others is that silence diminishes the likelihood of harm
in most cases.
In becoming privy to information about a client, a lawyer may foresee that the client intends
serious harm to another person. However, to the extent a lawyer is required or permitted to
disclose a client's purposes, the client will be inhibited from revealing facts which would
enable the lawyer to counsel against a wrongful course of action. The public is better protected
if full and open communication by the client is encouraged than if it is inhibited.
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 cmt. 9; see also Model Rules of Professional
Conduct pmbl. (1994); Legislative History, supra note 13, at 13.
67. See Wolfram, supra note 32, § 6.7.3, at 301 (identifying "prophyla.tic protection against
lawyer misjudgments" as "only imaginable reason" for "universal prohibition" of Rule 1.6).
68. See Model Code ofProfessional Responsibility DR 4-101 (1980).
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broader "information," a term that embraces virtually all data relating to
a client regardless of whether it is protected by the attorney-client
privilege or whether it was gained during the attorney-client relationship
or at some other time." If secrecy is part of what attorneys are selling,
the Rule increases both supply and demand.7"
2. The Prohibition and Exceptions
The first subsection of Rule 1.6 provides both a prohibition against
disclosure of client information and a commonsense exception for
disclosures impliedly or expressly authorized.7 The second subsection
empowers, but does not require, the attorney to disclose information in
two situations: (1) to prevent a serious crime,72 and (2) to protect
attorney interests.73
Rule 1.6(b)(1) empowers (but does not require) the attorney to
disclose information to prevent the client from committing a crime that
is likely to result in "imminent death or substantial bodily harm."74 In
other words, disclosure is permissive.75 The Rule declines to set any
normative standard to indicate when an attorney should disclose client
69. The Rule broadened the reach of the duty by eliminating Code language that limited the
prohibition to disclosures that would be embarrassing or detrimental to the client. It is not
necessary that the client declare information confidential to activate the duty. Further, there is no
requirement that the information be embarrassing or detrimental for the duty to apply. See Gillers
& Simon, Jr., supra note 48, at 65-66, 69-70.
70. In market terms, the scope provision increases the supply of secrecy by enlarging the
universe of protected information and the prohibition against disclosure increases demand by
reducing disincentives to seeking advice.
71. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 cmt. 7.
72 See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6. For the purpose of brevity, the term
"serious crimes" is sometimes used to refer to the exceptions for "imminent death or substantial
bodily harm" stated in Rule 1.6(b).
73. See Rule 1.6(bX2).
74. Rule 1.6(bXl).
75. In January 1980, the ABA solicited comments on the Model Rules by publishing a
Discussion Draft of the Model Rules. See Michael W. Maupin, Environmental Law, The Corporate
Lawyer and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 36 Bus. Law. 431, 431 (1981). The
Discussion Draft Rule required attorneys to disclose information to prevent serious crimes: "A
lawyer shall disclose information about a client to the extent it appears necessary to prevent the
client from committing an act that would result in death or serious bodily harm to another person..
."See id at 449 (emphasis added) (providing full text of Discussion Draft Rule, then numbered
Rule 1.7). As adopted, the Rule is two steps removed from this draft. First, it rejects a mandate to
attorneys to disclose information in the circumstances of the exceptions and, second, it rejects a
normative standard as well.
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information.76 Instead, the power of an attorney to reveal information
under this section attaches only when a two-pronged test is met. This
test pairs an extreme consequence (imminent death or substantial bodily
harm) with the most reprehensible conduct (commission of a crime)."
Context is needed to make the effect of this choice clear. If the
terrorists who bombed the Federal Building in Oklahoma City had
retained an attorney prior to the bombing and revealed their serious
intent to carry out this plan, Rule 1.6 would impose no duty on the
attorney to reveal their intentions. The Rule would allow such disclosure
as a, crime with serious consequence but there is no case in which it
requires disclosure. The Model Rules prohibit any attorney conduct that
would aid the commission of a crime.7'
The standard of Rule 1.6(b)(1) is difficult to satisfy, especially when
its uncertainty is taken into account.79 Perhaps the client will not act at
all, because of a change of heart, for example. Rule 1.6(b)(2) provides
contrast. It states a liberal disclosure rule, allowing an attorney to reveal
information about the client to protect the attorney's own interests.
80
76. As the Scope of the Model Rules notes, "Many of the Comments use the term 'should."' See
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Scope para. 13 (1994). By contrast, Rule 1.6 provides little
guidance in identifying a situation that justifies disclosure.
77. Similarly, the proposed draft of Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers includes the
requirement that the client conduct creating peril be a criminal act. See Restatement (Third) of the
Law Governing Lawyers § I17A (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996) (authorizing disclosure of
confidential client information to prevent "death or serious bodily injury from occurring as the'
result of a crime that the client has committed or intends to commit").
78. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.3(aX2) (1994). Additionally, if a statute
requires disclosure of information relating to the plan, it provides an independent requirement
under positive law.
mhe disciplinary rules are only part of the law by which a lawyer is governed. A lawyer can
be held liable under criminal law for aiding or abetting a crime, including the crime of fraud. A
lawyer also can be held civilly liable on essentially the same terms. Strictly speaking, the basis
of such liability is not violation of the rules of professional ethics, for those rules do not of
themselves create criminal or civil liability.
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Lawyer Liability in Third Party Situations: The Meaning of the Kaye
Scholer Case, 26 Akron L. Rev. 395,399 (1993).
79. See infra Parts III.B.2 and .B.3 for a discussion of the Penitent Client Clause and Safer
Harbor Provisions of Rule 1.6.
80. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(bX2) (1994). Rule 1.6 allows disclosure
when an attorney reasonably believes a revelation is necessary to establish a claim or defense on
his or her behalf. Rule 1.6(bX2). Rule 1.6 also permits disclosure if either of the stated exceptions
is met. Hence, a dispute involving an attorney brings her to the same point Df analysis as a belief
that the client intends to commit a crime likely to result in the imminent demth or serious bodily
harm of another. It seems unlikely, of course, that an attorney needs greater encouragement to
protect her own interests.
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The two exceptions set forth in Rule 1.6(b)(2) are introduced in the
prohibitory provision of Rule 1.6(a) with language that suggests they are
exclusive. The Rule declares that the lawyer "shall not reveal (client)
information" except for implied authorizations and "as stated in
paragraph (b).""s This language admits no other exception. 2
In justifying the reach of the Rule and constrained exceptions,
proponents of the ultimately adopted version of Rule 1.6 argued that the
narrow rule was necessary to prevent the legal system from using
lawyers as "policemen" of their clients 3 and to "encourage fuller and
franker communication between a lawyer and client by narrowing the
circumstances in which the lawyer could disclose client confidences." 4
Proponents also asserted that narrowing the scope of permissible
disclosures would result in "more adequate legal advice."8 5
At first blush, the Rule appears to endorse a neutral balance. It
declares that the attorney "may" reveal information when specified
circumstances exist. Thus, it evokes the familiar paradigm of a general
rule with exceptions and appears to invest the attorney with discretion to
judge the exceptions. But the attorney's discretion is narrowly
constrained. The attorney's judgment that a danger should be revealed is
not sufficient to invoke the exception. He is forbidden to reveal client
information except when one of the specific circumstances stated in the
exceptions is present.8 6 Additionally, the range of attorney choice is
narrow and not truly discretionary. The lawyer is empowered to reveal
81. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(a).
82. See 1 Hazard, Jr. & Hodes, supra note 34, § 1.6:101, at 128-29 (Supp. 1997) (noting
"standard account" that "well informed lawyers-who might not be as well informed without the
rule-can often prevent social harms by counseling.clients and securing their compliance with
law").
83. See Legislative History, supra note 13, at 48.
84. Id.; see Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (quoting Trammel v. United
States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)). The same justification is given for relationships of confidentiality
between other professionals and their clients. See, e.g., In re Lifschutz, 467 P.2d 557 (Cal. 1970)
(holding that state constitution does not secure absolute privilege concerning all psychotherapeutic
communications). In Tarasoffv. Regents of the University of Califoria, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976),
the defendant-therapist argued that "free and open communication is essential to psychotherapy,"
and that without assurances of complete confidentiality, patients "'will be reluctant to make the full
disclosure upon which diagnosis and treatment... depends."' Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 346 (quoting
Sen. Comm. on Judiciary regarding Cal. Evid. Code § 1014); see also John G. Fleming & Bruce
Maximov, The Patient orHis Victim: The Therapist's Dilemma, 62 Cal. L. Rev. 1025 (1974).
85. See Legislative History, supra note 13, at 48.
86. "The command of Rule 1.6(bXl) as adopted is clear ... lawyers who have mere knowledge
of an impending client fraud, and who cannot plausibly be charged with participation or facilitation
must suffer in silence.' See I Hazard, Jr. & Hodes, supra note 34, § 1.6:302, at 168.49 (Supp.
r996).
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information only when she "reasonably believes" its revelation is
necessary to prevent the intended serious crime."
Study of the exception for harm to others suggests that the ABA may
have given short shrift to the interests of third parties and the public in
this balance. Although protection of the client and the attorney is clear
from the language and structure of Rule 1.6, the actual range of
protection achieved by the Rule for the public and third parties
(individual units of the public) is nebulous and perhaps illusory.
B. The Momentum of the Rule
1. The Preamble
As legal rules provide a framework for action, they create their own
momentum and force, indicating a preference for a particular outcome.
Frequently, rules will both declare the expected outcome and indicate
that a different result should inhere when circumstances are
compellingly different from the general expectation. Thus, many legal
doctrines can be analyzed in terms of general rules with accompanying
exceptions. The "momentum" of a rule can be seen in myriad settings."8
For example, in tort law punitive damages are not recoverable unless the
defendant's conduct is found to be outrageous.8 9
In contrast to the norm of general rules and exceptions, the
momentum of Rule 1.6 moves inexorably toward a categorical bar
87. Use of the adverb "reasonably" to qualify the attorney's discretion suggests a second
judgment, coming after the attorney's decision, perhaps by a judge or by a state's board of
professional responsibility. On the other hand, some standard of judgment must be set. A
reasonableness standard provides an objective test while a purely discretionary standard might
unduly insulate the attorney's decision from the client's scrutiny.
88. Laws created to prevent discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
are examples of the momentum of legal doctrine. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994). In
constitutional law, heightened scrutiny provides protection by assigning special weight in the
balance for interests deemed entitled to protected status. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964). In commercial
law, legal preferences are weaker. Thus, the effect or defaults of the applicable rules can be
changed by contracting partners. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L.J. 87 (1989); Ian Ayres, Preliminary
Thoughts on Optimal Tailoring of Contractual Rules, 3 S. Cal. Interdisciplinary L.J. 1 (1993).
89. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965) ("Outrageous Conduct Causing Severe
Emotional Distress"); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908 (1965) ("Punitiv Damages"); see also
DiTeodoro v. J.G. Durand Int'l, 566 F. Supp. 273 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
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against disclosure:' the prohibition is broad; its exceptions are narrow
and difficult to apply; and the policy expressed in the comments and
other statements of the Model Rules emphasize the need to err on the
side of silence.9 The attorney's decision to refuse to disclose client
information is not a violation of the Rule even in the dramatic
circumstances of its exceptions. Although Rule 1.6 recognizes the
competing interests at issue, it does so without suggesting that the
balance will ever justify, much less mandate, disclosure. Calling such a
rule a balance of competing interests may be an overstatement. 93
The Preamble statement that a lawyer "should keep" client
information in confidence highlights the importance of confidentiality as
a central obligation of attorneys. The statement provides moral suasion
by use of the word "should." The Preamble also states its goal of
balancing the interests of client, lawyer, and the public. 4 However,
despite the goal of balancing these interests, the primary beneficiary of
the Rule is the individual client. The Preamble's analysis accomplishes
the balancing of the named interests once and for all, making a
categorical conclusion that disclosure is never justified.
A lawyer's responsibilities as a representative of clients, an officer
of the legal system and a public citizen are usually harmonious.
Thus, when an opposing party is well represented, a lawyer can be
a zealous advocate on behalf of a client and at the same time
assume that justice is being done. So also, a lawyer can be sure that
preserving client confidences ordinarily serves the public interest
because people are more likely to seek legal advice, and thereby
heed their legal obligations, when they know their communications
will be private.95
90. In his article Conflict and Trust Between Attorney and Client, Professor Robert Burt
characterized the Model Rules as a mix of recognition of attorney-client conflict and a "misty
wishing it away.' Burt, supra note 55, at 1026.
91. See infra Part Il.B.2 discussing the Penitent Client Comment.
92. See Legislative History, supra note 13, at 12.
93. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 cmts. 9, 14 (1994); Legislative History,
supra note 13, at 53.
94. The Preamble states that "[v]irtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict
between a lawyer's responsibilities to clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer's own interest
in remaining an upright person.' Model Rules of Professional Conduct pmbl. para. 8 (1994). The
Preamble also notes that conflicts "must be resolved through the exercise of sensitive professional
and moral judgment guided by the basic principles underlying the Rules." Model Rules pmbl. para.
8; see Legislative History, supra note 13, at 12.
95. Model Rules of Professional Conduct pmbl. para. 7. The proposed preamble language in this
section was changed. The proposed language stated that people are more likely to heed their legal
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A line-by-line analysis of this statement illustrates the categorical
nature of the Rule's stance against disclosure. The statement begins with
a general discussion of the duties of representation; it minimizes the
difficulty of balancing the competing interests involved, stating that the
roles are "usually harmonious." This statement is unassailable on its
own terms.96 It assumes the ideal situation: a "well-represented"
opposing party. Indeed, at some level, all attorneys must assume that
competent representation is the norm.97 Nonetheless, the absence of any
reference to a situation other than this ideal of competent representation
is noteworthy. The Preamble suggests no process for action or analysis
in circumstances more difficult than the ideal. Rather, it presents the
justification for the standard of confidentiality by linking it with the
imponderable of zealous representation, focusing on the generality-the
way things should (and in many cases do) work.98 In fact, the need for
the prohibition in the ordinary case is not subject to controversy."
Nevertheless, the exceptional case requires attention. Clarification of
attorney duties in these exceptional cases can be crucial.
The Preamble's next statement deals specifically with confidentiality.
It builds on the foundational statement of the ideal, justifying the rule of
confidentiality on the basis that a lawyer "can be sure" that the rule
"ordinarily serves the public interest."'" This conclusion is stated with
certainty: nondisclosure is justified because of the transcendent benefit
to the "public interest." This categorical statement achieves the task of
balancing without acknowledging any counterweight to its principle.
The message is that whatever harm is feared in the particular case, it
obligations "when they know they can do so in private.' Legislative History, supra note 13, at 9-
10.
96. The profession's view of itself has been assailed often, however, basec on the social utility
of the profession. "While this professed harmony between personal and professional ethics carries
with it a comforting security and deceptive public appeal, it, nevertheless, strices a discordant note
with some who have given the ethical codes a closer look." Lorentz, supra note 4, at 2.
97. Moreover, measures for leveling the playing field are too unclear, allowing adjustment in the
interest of equality.
98. This statement provides the focus of the discussion, justifying nondisclosure with a
generality. At this point, the reader cannot condemn the summary. It is, after all, only a summary
possibly leaving the harder cases for the particulars in the rules themselves. A full reading of the
Rule and comments, however, reveals no fuller treatment of problem cases. The existence of viable
exceptions in the Rule would make this general declaration less troubling.
99. "In routine cases, attomey-client confidentiality is uncontroversial. It protects clients and
benefits society by enabling the legal system to work." Zacharias, supra note 1, at 356. "In practice
it is probably true that most future acts of client wrongdoing are preventel by effective client
counseling." Wolfram, supra note 32, § 12.6.3, at 667.
100. Model Rules of Professional Conduct pmbl. para. 7.
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cannot outweigh the public interest served by silence: people seek
advice and heed it because of the rule of confidentiality."0 '
The commentary to Rule 1.6 continues the justification of social
utility. Comment 3 notes the general operation of the Rule. "Almost
without exception, clients come to lawyers in order to determine what
their rights are and what is, in the maze of laws and regulations, deemed
to be legal and correct ... Based upon experience, lawyers know that
almost all clients follow the advice given, and the law is upheld."'1 2 The
comment justifies the rule in the individual case based on the
generalization that "almost all clients follow the advice given, and the
law is upheld."'0 3 It freezes the scene at the point of lawyer counseling,
ignoring the situation in which the lawyer is unsuccessful in urging a
change of heart by the client.
Comment 9 notes the utilitarian basis for silence found in the fear that
a rule more lenient toward disclosures would chill communications
between lawyer and client and result in loss of the opportunity to
influence client conduct for the good.
In becoming privy to information about a client, a lawyer may
foresee that the client intends serious harm to another person.
However, to the extent a lawyer is required or permitted to disclose
a client's purposes, the client will be inhibited from revealing facts
which would enable the lawyer to counsel against a wrongful
course of action. The public is better protected if full and open
communication by the client is encouraged than if it is inhibited."°
This comment acknowledges the possibility of a client intent on
inflicting "serious harm" to others but gives no indication that disclosure
is ever an appropriate response to the problem. 5 The comment assumes
that without a strong rule of confidentiality people will not seek a
lawyer's advice."es The converse is that a strong prohibition against
101. "Over the long run client-lawyer conversations will actually decrease the total number of
crimes and frauds, because clients in genuine doubt about a course of conduct will be dissuaded
from illegal action by their questionable schemes hoping to be talked out of them." 2 Hazard, Jr. &
Hodes, supra note 34, app. 3, at 1236.
102. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 cmt. 3 (1994).
103. Rule 1.6 cmt. 3.
104. Rule 1.6 cmt. 9.
105. A draft of the Model Rules discarded before presentation to the ABA House of Delegates
provided for mandatory disclosure in the case of serious crimes. See 2 Hazard, Jr. & Hodes, supra
note 34, § AP4:104, at 1262.
106. The same concept justifies confidentiality in other professions as well. See Jaffee v.
Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1929 (1996) (recognizing psychotherapist privilege under Rule 501
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disclosure will increase the likelihood that people will seek legal
advice."0 7 Even assuming that more people seek legal advice under a
strong rule of confidentiality, however, the notion that more people will
"heed" their legal obligations is open to question.
1 8
The linchpin of the Rule's justification of the social utility"° of
nondisclosure is that clients will heed the counsel of attorneys urging
them to comply with the law."0 It stands to reason that a rule
encouraging disclosure may have a chilling effiect on client
communications as compared with a rule encouraging no disclosure."'
Under an economic view, however, the client will take iato account the
attorney's power to reveal the client's confidences or to take action to
protect others from client conduct. The greater the client's certainty that
the attorney has no power beyond admonishing compliance, the less
likely the client will heed the attorney's advice."' Some clients will be
dissuaded from harmful conduct by learning that it is unlawful, but
others may use the attorney's counsel, not to comply with the law but to
exploit advantages."' Assuming an attorney has an opportunistic
based on need for confidentiality in mental health area). Nevertheless, context is relevant. In Jaffee
the privilege recognized did not relate to disclosures to prevent future harm. "Without a privilege,
much of the desirable evidence to which litigants such as petitioner seek access-for example,
admissions against interest by a party-is unlikely to come into being. This unspoken 'evidence'
will therefore serve no greater truth-seeking function than if it had been spoken and privileged." la
107. This assumption, like other assumptions with significant impact on legal rules, should be
studied empirically. "In attempting to assess the impact of confidentiality on clients, it
is... important for future empirical research to seek the information from laypersons and clients
themselves." Zacharias, supra note 1, at 397.
108. "To accept the modem systemic arguments in favor of confidentiality, one must reach one
of two conclusions: first, that clients would use lawyers significantly less if more exceptions
existed; second, that clients who employ lawyers would reveal substantially less information. Both
conclusions are questionable." Id at 363-64.
109. The Model Rules note that the legal profession "has a responsibility to assure that its
regulations are conceived in the public interest and not in furtherance of parociial or self-interested
concerns of the bar." Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct pmbl. para. 11 (1994).
110. As is noted earlier, another reason for the Rule that serves a social purpose is the need for
full representation of individuals. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text. This purpose
bears less directly on the issue of disclosure of a serious intended crime than the argument that the
duty to disclose would chill discussions of crime and reduce the attorney's influence to persuade
the client to abandon his injurious plan. See Monroe H. Freedman, Client Confidences and Client
Perury: Some Unanswered Questions, 136 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1939 (1988).
111. In some circumstances a chilling effect is not a bad thing. See 1 Hazard, Jr. & Hodes, supra
note 34, § 1.6:110, at 168.5 (Supp. 1996) (noting that "if clients bent on fiaud are 'chilled,' so
much the better").
112 Ironically, when confidentiality is certain, the likelihood that the rule will have the full
effect intended may be diminished.
113. "Knowledge of the law thus is two-edged. When the lawyer is in a s-tuation in which the
client may well use the relevant knowledge of the law to violate the law or avoid its norms, what
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client,'14 Rule 1.6 may reduce the effectiveness of attorney counseling
because the client knows the attorney is powerless to counteract his
wrongful conduct. Rule 1.6 prohibits the attorney from speaking to
rectify the effects of client conduct -furthered by the representation.
Although other rules of the Model Rules seek to check opportunistic or
wrongful conduct by clients, they do not expressly allow disclosure." 5
Though an attorney may have knowledge of a future crime or fraud or
past benefit achieved through her representation, she has no right to
reveal this knowledge unless the strictures of Rule 1.6 are satisfied.
2. The Penitent Client Comment
Comment 13 of Rule 1.6 deals with the exception for disclosure of
intended crimes. It acknowledges attorney discretion within carefully
hedged categories but continues to counsel nondisclosure as the
preferred choice.
The lawyer may make a disclosure in order to prevent homicide or
serious bodily injury which the lawyer reasonably believes is
intended by a client. It is very difficult for a lawyer to "know"
when such a heinous purpose will actually be carried out, for the
client may have a change of mind."6
An attorney consulting Rule 1.6 and its comments for guidance on
whether to disclose client information is reminded by this comment 13
that the client may not carry out his declared intention."7 Thus, the
ought the lawyer to do?" Stephen L Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in
the Jurisprudence and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 Yale L.J. 1545, 1547 (1995); see also Lon Fuller
& John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159
(1958); Lawry, supra note 55, at 321.
114. Unfortunately, the assumption of an opportunistic client does not require a suspension of
disbelief or a departure from experience. See, e.g., Roth Steel Prods. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 705
F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1983) (setting aside compromise agreement with higher price based on finding
that sellers engaged in coercion by threatening not to sell in future to buyer); Austin Instrument,
Inc. v. Loral Corp., 272 N.E.2d 533 (N.Y. 1971) (finding that seller's threat to withhold delivery
constituted economic duress when buyer faced genuine possibility of substantial liquidated
damages and other vendors were unable to commence delivery of item soon enough); see also 1
Hazard, Jr. & Hodes, supra note 34, § 1.6:101, at 130.1 (Supp. 1997) (noting that exceptions to
Rule 1.6 are necessary "lest unworthy clients take advantage of the rules").
115. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rules 1.2, 1.16, 3.3 (1994). See also infra notes
139, 214 to 217 and accompanying text for a discussion of these rules.
116. Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct Rule 1.6 cmt. 13 (1994).
117. In the context of the therapist's duty to warn others of danger created by a patient, the
California Supreme Court considered the uncertain nature of threats or statements of intent to harm
others.
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attorney is encouraged to doubt even a straightforward statement of
intent by a client.1
18
This may be one point in the analysis that is easier in environmental
cases. If the crime is an ongoing violation such as a contamination of
property with hazardous wastes, a crime has already been committed.
Under many environmental statutes, the continued edstence of the
contamination is classified as a new crime each day."9 The status quo is
both a past crime (which is certain) and a future crime (which is likely).
Thus, the client's refusal to comply with the law by reporting the
condition constitutes a future "criminal act that the lavyer reasonably
believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily
harm."' 0 This situation is not subject to the statement that it is "very
difficult to know" whether the "heinous purpose will actually be carried
out." A change of heart in this setting would be a determination by the
client to begin the correction or remediation process. It is likely that the
crime will occur again (tomorrow).' Because the possibility of a
penitent client is only one rationale for the broad rule against
nondisclosure, the implications of this difference in the environmental
context are unclear. Even when the criminal conduct element of the
exception is met, the attorney must speculate about the seriousness of
the harm that may flow from the crime.
Weighing the uncertain and conjectural character of the alleged damage done the patient by
such a warning against the peril to the victim's life, we conclude that professional inaccuracy
in predicting violence cannot negate the therapist's duty to protect the threatened victim.
Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 346 (Cal. 1976).
118. This statement may be simply an explanation of the reason for abandoning a "knowledge"
standard, meaning that the attorney may disclose when he meets the less -.tringent standard of
reasonable belief. Such an explication seems unnecessary, however, because the history of the Rule
does not suggest that a knowledge standard was proposed. See Legislative History, supra note 13,
at 47-51.
119. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(cXI)(B) (1994) (providing penalty of between $2500 and
$25,000 per day and imprisonment of up to one year for negligently introducing hazardous
substances into sewer system or publicly owned treatment works); 33 U.S.C. § 1319(cX2) (1994)
(providing penalty of between $5000 and $50,000 per day for knowing violations of Act); 42
U.S.C. § 6928(dXl) (1994); see also Roger M. Klein, The Continuing Nature of Notification
Violations Under Environmental Statutes, 26 Envtl. L. 565 (1996).
120. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6.
121. Uncertainty remains even in such cases of continuing crimes, however. "Do the Model
Rules give you the option to reveal that information [of a continuing crime] to the public, or to
appropriate authorities? If revealing your knowledge of your client's intention to commit a future
crime would likely have the effect of divulging a past crime, is disclosure permissible?" George W.
Van Cleve, Environmental Law in the 1990's and Its Principal Implications for Professional
Responsibility, C534 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 407, at 417 (June 25, 1990), available in WESTLAW, A.L.I.-
A.B.A. CLE Materials File.
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3. The "Safer" Harbor Comment
Next the official comment offers the attorney a safer harbor in a
difficult situation: "A lawyer's decision not to take preventive action
permitted by paragraph (b)(1) does not violate this Rule."'" The
"preventive action" referred to is disclosure of client information. Read
literally, this comment states that no matter how extreme the danger or
harm intended by a client, the attorney's decision to remain silent about
the client's intent is not a violation of the Rule." Even if the client
seriously threatens an imminent murder, the Rule offers no
encouragement to warn the third party.124
The import of this statement is not lost on the practicing attorney.
Attorneys are trained to evaluate the relative risks and benefits of
various courses of conduct. In a majority of transactions the attorney
focuses on the primary goal of avoiding violations. Both common sense
and legal training identify the preferred option as one carrying the
lowest risk: nondisclosure.
The power of this safer harbor comment can be illustrated by
examining the benefits and risks of two options: choice A
(nondisclosure) and choice B (disclosure). If choice A is never a
violation of the Rule but choice B may be a violation, choice A is
preferred as the less risky choice. Additionally, if choice B can be
deemed an acceptable alternative (nonviolative of the Rule) only after a
series of difficult judgment calls, as in the case of Rule 1.6, the
likelihood that the attorney will choose choice B (revealing client
information) is further reduced. Finally, when some of those difficult
judgments calls cannot be verified, the risk of choice B is heightened
still further. For example, under Rule 1.6, when the attorney discloses
client information (choice B) in time to prevent the client from
committing a crime, the question of whether or not the crime would ever
have been consummated will always remain unanswered. Likewise,
whether the uncommitted crime would have resulted in death or
substantial bodily harm is unknowable. Assuming the client would have
acted, the victim might have eluded harm through his own efforts or
favorable circumstances. Thus, choice A is a safer harbor by far than
122. Model Rules of Professional Conduct 1.6 cmt. 14.
123. The comment does not advert to the fact that the decision may violate other provisions of
the Model Rules or positive law.
124. Of course, the attorney may have a duty under positive law (statutory or common law) to
report such intentions by anyone.
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choice B. Of course, this view of risks to the attorney fails to take into
account disclosure obligations created by positive law."z
The Scope section of the Model Rules underscores the conclusion that
the safer route is nondisclosure. This statement cautions against re-
examination of the lawyer's discretion in one instance (choice A): "The
lawyer's exercise of discretion not to disclose information under Rule
1.6 should not be subject to reexamination."'26 Like the commentary of
Rule 1.6 and the Preamble, this statement relies on the policy
justification of the general good. "Permitting such re-examination would
be incompatible with the general policy of promoting compliance with
law through assurances that communications will be protected against
disclosure."'
127
Hence, the Rule and commentary present a strong case for
nondisclosure. First, the Rule defines narrow situations in which an
attorney has discretion to reveal information. Next, the comment
encourages the attorney (in the exercise of this discretion) to doubt that a
client will carry out his communicated intent to commit a crime. Finally,
it assures the attorney that she will not be in violation of the Rule if she
remains silent. When an attorney consults Rule 1.6 to seek guidance
regarding whether to disclose client information, he will find no case in
which disclosure is mandated or encouraged. Rather than identifying a
balance to be applied to particular circumstances, the Rule makes the
assessment and categorically concludes that nondisclosure is always the
best choice.2 '
125. The Rule engenders this myopia by its deletion of any mention of the duty to disclose
information in response to positive law. For a discussion on the deletion of positive law as a basis
for disclosure, see infa notes 152 to 164 and accompanying text.
126. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Scope para. 20 (1994). Professor Simon has
noted that the Model Rules "contemplate decisions exempt from review and discipline." See
William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1083, 1088 (1988)
(suggesting that Model Rules might create private norms).
127. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Scope par. 20.
128. This treatment of conflict and resolution is similar to the short story The Senior Partner's
Ethics. See Louis Auchincloss, The Senior Partner's Ethics, in Skinny Island: More Tales Of
Manhattan 194 (1987). In the story, a young associate, Brendan Bross, seeks the counsel of
Laurison Phelps, the managing partner of a respected firm. Bross communicates his certain
knowledge that a partner in the firm has falsely denied the existence of a document sought in
discovery. Under the guise of analyzing the options open to Bross, Phelps, the "senior partner" of
the title, uses his advocacy skills to try to dissuade the young attorney from disclosing the
document. Md. at 208-11, cited in Lawry, supra note 55, at 349-51. Like the senior partner, Rule
1.6 employs analysis of competing interests to advocate silence.
Vol. 72:409, 1997
Environmental Hazards and Model Rule 1.6
C. The Evolution of the Rule-Changes from the Proposed Rule
The Proposed Rules drafted by the Kutak Commission generated
great controversy, primarily because the broader exceptions to the
prohibition against disclosure of client information were regarded as a
"radical attack on the adversary system. '29 A review of these changes
charts the movement away from any concern for the interests of third
parties and toward an absolute rule of nondisclosure. " ' "The ABA
House of Delegates retained the basic structure of Rule 1.6 but rejected
most of the exceptions to confidentiality that had been proposed."'' The
dramatic changes made to Proposed Rule 1.6 during debate by the ABA
House of Delegates rendered the Rule "so nearly absolute as to be
unworkable in practice."'32 Proposed Rule 1.6, drafted by the Kutak
Commission, provided as follows:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation
of a client except as stated in paragraph (b), unless the client
consents after disclosure.
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer
believes necessary:
(1) To serve the client's interests, unless it is information the
client has specifically requested not be disclosed;
(2) To prevent the client from committing a criminal or
fraudulent act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in
death or substantial bodily harm, or substantial injury to the
financial interest or property of another;
(3) To rectify the consequences of a client's criminal or
fraudulent act in the commission of which the lawyer's
services had been used;
129. W. William Hodes, The Code of Professional Responsibility, The Kutak Rules, and the
Trial Lawyer's Code: Surprisingly, Three Peas in a Pod, 35 U. Miami L. Rev. 739, 741 (1981). As
Hodes explains, "Critics saw the Discussion Draft [of the Model Rules] as radical primarily, and
often exclusively, because of its provisions regulating the preservation of client confidences and
the situations in which the lawyer may or must disclose them." Id. at 745.
130. Changes such as the broadening of the class of protected data from "confidences and
secrets" to "information," and the narrowing of the categories within the attorney's discretion add
to the momentum of the Rule noted above.
131. 2 Hazard, Jr. & Hodes, supra note 34, § AP4:103, at 1260.
132. lId
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(4) To establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in
a controversy between the lawyer and the client, or to
establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against
the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was
involved; or
(5) To comply with the rules of professional conduct or other
law. 3
3
The following changes were made during the process of debate on
Proposed Rule 1.6: (1) deletion of the exception for fraudulent client
acts; (2) deletion of the duty to rectify client fraud furthered by the
attorney; (3) deletion of the protection of property interests and financial
interests of non-clients; (4) deletion of the reference to disclosures
permitted "to comply with other law"; and (5) addition of the term
"imminent" to qualify "death.' ' 34 Each of these changes constrains the
attorney's ability to reveal client information. They are discussed below
as they relate to the issue of confidentiality in the context of potential
environmental hazards.
1. Deletion of the Fraud Exception
As adopted, Rule 1.6 provides no basis for disclosure of fraudulent
acts, even when such fraud will result in significant injury. 135 This result
unjustifiably elevates the interests of the client over those of third parties
without assessing the weight of each interest. "[A] client is entitled to
complete confidentiality with respect to proper legal representation, but
has no justified expectation of confidentiality when he uses the attorney
to perpetrate a fraud on another person."'
36
The categories of fraud and crime intersect in some cases.
Nevertheless, that a fraud may result in serious injury does not
133. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (Proposed Final Draft 1981), reprinted in
Hodes, supra note 129, at 807 n.242.
134. For a more thorough assessment of the changes made during the debate on the Model
Rules, see Hodes, supra note 129.
135. See Caudill, supra note 4, at 370-71. Caudill asserts:
[I]f an attorney faces ethical sanctions or liability to third parties for failure to report client
fraud, should we join the current trends of legal scholarship and of the courts in condemning
him or her, or should we view that individual as caught within a confusing web of inconsistent
guidelines and conflicting duties, of dangerous line-drawing and expensive moral
introspection?
Id.
136. Aronson, supra note 55, at 832.
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automatically render that fraud a crime."' The conduct constitutes a
crime only if the legislature has defined it as such. Assuming that the
conduct is a crime, the attorney must search for and interpret the
applicable statute-a time-consuming job in urgent circumstances. 3'
Although other provisions of the Model Rules deal with the issue of
client fraud,'39 none authorizes disclosure.
An example of a dangerous fraud in the area of environmental law is
the seller's fraudulent statement that property sold to a third party has a
clean "bill of health" when, in fact, the property is contaminated with
hazardous wastes. Some states require sellers to disclose the
environmental contamination existing on property offered for sale. 40
Additionally, damages may be recovered from the vendor"4' and perhaps
137. Some attorneys assume that any fraud that creates serious danger will also be prohibited by
a criminal statute. To justify the deletion by this argument proves too much, however. If the intent
of the Rule is to capture dangerous frauds as crimes, there seems to be no reason to subsume the
category.
138. "Unfortunately, the current state of the law provides very little guidance to the attorney
who is confronted with client fraud." Committee on Prof 1 Responsibility, Association of the Bar of
the City of N.Y., Report on the Debate Over Whether There Should Be an Exception to
Confidentiality for Rectifying a Crime or Fraud, 20 Fordham Urb. LU. 857, 862-63 (1993)
(focusing on issue of past frauds but assessing current state of law generally).
139. Under Rule 1.2, an attorney may not assist a client in a fraud. Model Rules of Professional
Conduct Rule 1.2 (1994). Comment 11 of Rule 1.6 presents a carefully drawn line relating to
disclosure of client fraud, rejecting any duty to rectify fraud of a client. It states: "Mhe lawyer may
have been innocently involved in past conduct by the client that was criminal or fraudulent. In such
a situation the lawyer has not violated Rule 1.2(d), because to 'counsel or assist' criminal or
fraudulent conduct requires knowing that the conduct is of that character." Model Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 cmt. 11 (1994). In other words, the attorney may not assist in
fraudulent or criminal conduct but he must not disclose the conduct, even if he has assisted in it
unknowingly, except in the exception stated in Rule 1.6(b) to prevent a serious crime. This fine line
has been criticized. See, e.g., Lester Brickman, Keeping Quiet in the Face of Fraud, L.A. Times
(Metro), Mar. 12, 1992, at B7. Additionally, Rule 3.3 prohibits an attorney from using false
evidence but denies the attorney the right to disclose information to prevent a client from
committing a fraudulent act even when the attorney reasonably believes that the fraud is likely to
result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule
1.6 (1994).
140. See, e.g., Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25359.7 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997); Mo. Ann. Stat.
§ 260.465 (Vernon 1990); NJ. Stat. Ann. § 13:1K-6 (West 1991 & Supp. 1996); 35 Pa. Cons. Stat.
Ann. § 6018.405 (West 1990); Alexander v. McKnight, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453, 456 (Ct. App. 1992)
(relying on Cal. Code § 1102.6 to find that failure to disclose negative fact when it can reasonably
be said to have foreseeable depressing effect on property value is tortious); O'Leary v. Industrial
Park Corp., 542 A.2d 333, 336 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988) (holding that failure to disclose facts and
existence of request or circumstance that imposes duty to speak forms essence of fraudulent
misrepresentation); Strawn v. Canuso, 638 A.2d 141, 150 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. 1994) (following
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551 to hold that seller and broker had duty to disclose existence of
landfill), af/'d, 657 A.2d 420 (NJ. 1995).
141. See Lingsch v. Savage, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201 (Ct. App. 1963) (noting that seller liable for
failure to disclose known material defects in property); Strawn, 657 A.2d at 429 (stating that seller
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against the vendor's attorney142  if the contamination harms the
purchaser. Nevertheless, Model Rule 1.6 forbids the lawyer to disclose
the dangerous condition of the property unless the jurisdiction has
defined the client's conduct as a crime. In other words, the Rule refuses
to allow an attorney to act to protect third parties even though a court
may find him liable for the injury to those third parties.
Assessing the elements of a crime presents additional analytical
problems. Issues of intent present in criminal matters are not implicated
when the culpable conduct is merely fraud. Thus, the Rule makes the
attorney's decision to disclose client intentions riskier by requiring him
to decide an issue that cannot be determined with certainty prior to a
trial.
2. Deletion of the Duty To Rectify
The adopted version of Rule 1.6 provides no basis for disclosures to
rectify fraud or criminal acts. Because the attorney is at risk of being
blamed for the client's misdeeds, the exception to rectify crimes or
frauds arguably should be read back into the Rule.143 The exception
"must exist in the responsible practice of law."' The right to withdraw
from representation provides some protection against fraud. 145 In some
liable for failing to disclose that residences sold were within one-half mile of toxic waste dump).
Section 353 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that a seller who fails to disclose a
dangerous conditions known to him is liable for physical harm to persons on the land if the buyer
did not know and had no reason to know of the condition of the property. See Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 353 (1965); see also Leaking Underground Storage Tanks: Maine High Court
Says Seller of Property Had Absolute Duty to Disclose Leaky Tank, I I Toxics L. Reptr. (BNA) 838
(Jan. 8, 1997). See generally Sarah L. Inderbitzin, Taking the Burden off the Buyer: A Survey of
Hazardous Waste Disclosure Statutes, 1 Envtl. L. 513, 558 (1995) (arguing that buyer should have
option of voiding transfer of property contaminated with hazardous wastes when seller failed to
disclose contamination); Ann J. Rosenthal & R. Stuart Phillips, Tell It Like It k-Sellers' Duties of
Disclosure in Real Estate Transactions under California Law, 26 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 473
(1996).
142. Professionals who fall to warn third parties of dangerous activities intended by their clients
may be subject to tort liability. See Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P_2d 334 (Cal. 1976);
Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (Ct. App. 1984) (holding that real estate broker has duty
to conduct inspection of residential property offered for sale and to disclose facts that materially
affect value of land to prospective purchasers).
143. See 1 Hazard, Jr. & Hodes, supra note 34, § 1.6:202, at 168.4 (Supp. 1996) (stating that this
exception and exception to comply with law are "so necessary that they will almost certainly be
read back into Rule 1.6, one way or another, by courts, disciplinary authorities, and practicing
lawyers").
144. lad
145. Comment 14 to Rule 1.6 notes that a lawyer must withdraw in some circumstances: "If the
lawyer's services will be used by the client in materially furthering a coarse of criminal or
438
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circumstances the lawyer may also "disaffirm any opinion, document,
affirmation, or the like."'" Nevertheless, Rule 1.6 prohibits the attorney
from revealing the continuing threat.
To carry forward the above hypothetical, the lawyer may learn that
the purchaser (and his family) are at continuing risk because of a
completed transfer of contaminated land. Far from being a "panacea,"
the right of withdrawal makes little difference in many circumstances.' 47
In the context of environmental hazards, it does little to protect the
public from environmental risks. 48 An attorney who withdraws from
representation because of unreported environmental dangers or a
threatened environmental violation has no leverage. Unless the client is
involved in a related lawsuit at the time of the withdrawal, it is likely
that no one except the client will know about the withdrawal. 49
fraudulent conduct, the lawyer must withdraw, as stated in Rule l.16(aXl)." Model Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 cmt. 14 (1994). Additionally, when the mandate to withdraw does
not apply, Rule 1.16(b) gives attorneys wide latitude to choose to withdraw from representation.
For example, under Rule 1.16(bX2) a lawyer may either withdraw for "good cause" if the client has
used the "lawyer's services in the past to perpetuate a crime or fraud," or may withdraw when the
withdrawal "can be accomplished without material adverse effect" on the client's interests. See
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.16(b) (1994). This circumstance is a catch-all,
allowing the attorney to withdraw without any additional basis if the withdrawal will not be a
materially adverse burden on the client. Rule 1.16(b). The Rule includes situations in which the
client has failed to pay or in which the fee (though paid) fails to compensate the attorney
adequately. In other words, the attorney's ability to withdraw is unfettered if the withdrawal does
not significantly harm the client. Rule 1.16(b).
146. Comment 15 presents the right of "noisy withdrawal." It allows the attorney to give notice
of withdrawal in some circumstances. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 cmt. 15;
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 366 (1992) (deciding that
attorney may disaffirm work product when client intends to use work to continue fraudulent
conduct); see also Wolfram, supra note 32, § 9.5.3, at 548; Ernest F. Lidge III, Client Perjury in
Tennessee: A Misguided Ethics Opinion, an Amended Rule, and a Call for Further Action by the
Tennessee Supreme Court, 63 Tenn. L. Rev. 1 (1995).
147. 'The Ethics Report notes that the 'noisy withdrawal' provision is not a panacea for the
present limitations of black letter Model Rule 1.6(b)" Comm. on Profl Responsibility, Association
of the Bar of the City of N.Y., supra note 138, at 860.
148. This is not to say that work product disaffirmance lacks significant effects in other contexts.
See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 376 (1993) ('The
Lawyer's Obligation Where a Client Lies in Response to Discovery Requests"); ABA Comm. on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 366 (1992) ("Withdrawal When a Lawyer's
Services Will Otherwise Be Used to Perpetrate a Fraud").
149. Some argue that... "noisy" withdrawal is tantamount to the lawyer's rectification of the
fraud. Disaffirmance of work product, however, is not full disclosure in any sense. Most
importantly, the lawyer may not reveal the information that caused him or her to
withdraw; nor may the lawyer explain that the withdrawal is due to client fraud, since
that would violate the lawyer's duty of confidentiality imposed by Rule 1.6. The
argument that a noisy withdrawal is sufficient can be taken both ways: if "noisy"
withdrawal constitutes inferential disclosure of client fraud, why should the attorney be
prohibited from making full and explicit disclosure? On the other hand, if "noisy"
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3. Financial and Property Interests of Third Parties
According to the Reporter of the Model Rules, Professor Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., the proposed exception to protect the financial and property
interests of third parties "created a firestorm of protest."'53 Nevertheless,
this exception would not necessarily result in more disclosures by
attorneys. Rather, in many cases, it would result in a client changing the
course of his conduct or never formulating the harmful plan because of
the counsel he received from an attorney. In the environmental arena,
financial loss is likely to be dramatic. No matter how disabling a
financial loss might be, Rule 1.6 provides no protection for the financial
interest of third parties. This fact is more troubling when. one considers
the protection for financial interests accorded attorneys.' 5 '
4. Deletion ofDisclosures To "Comply with Other Law,"
The House of Delegates deleted the proposed exception to comply
with other law after debate during the February 1983 mid-year
meeting.5 2 As a practical matter, deletion of this provision may have
little or no effect on attorney obligations.' The Preamble to the Model
Rules acknowledges the power of positive law. 4 Additionally, comment
20 to the Rule notes that the Model Rules and "other law," may require
disclosure of client information in some circumstances.'55 Of even
withdrawal is something significantly less than rectification of client ftaud, then it
cannot be considered an adequate remedy for harms suffered by third parties.
Comm. on Prof'l Responsibility, Association of the Bar of the City of N.Y., supra note 138, at 865.
150. See 1 Hazard, Jr. & Hodes, supra note 34, § 1.6:109, at 168.3 (Supp. 1S 96).
151. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(bX2). Although thiTd party interests are
without positive protection under the Rule no matter how great the harm, financial interests of
attorneys are protected by the attorney self-defense exception-no matter how small. The
determinative factor of the attorney self-defense exception is the identity of the party (an attorney)
rather than the gravity of the harm sought to be avoided. Additionally, this protection for the
attorney is in sharp contrast to the ABA's caution against self-interest in the Preamble to the Model
Rules and raises serious questions regarding the ability of the profession to regulate itself.
152. See Legislative History, supra note 13, at 48.
153. Without reading in an exception to comply with law, Rule 1.6 fails to "survive even
linguistic analysis." See 1 Hazard, Jr. & Hodes, supra note 34, § 1.6:112, at 163.7 (Supp. 1996).
154. "A lawyer should keep in confidence information relating to repre.entation of a client
except so far as disclosure is required or permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other
law." Model Rules of Professional Conduct pmbl. para. 3 (1994).
155. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 cmt. 20 ("[A] lawyer may be obligated or
permitted by other provisions of law to give information about a client."); see 2 Hazard, Jr. &
Hodes, supra note 34, § AP4:104, at 1260-61 (Supp. 1994) (predicting that exception for
disclosures "required by law" must be added).
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greater weight, of course, is that legislatures have the power to regulate
the conduct of all persons within their jurisdiction, including
attorneys.5 6 Thus, positive law, enacted by a legislature trumps self-
regulation by attorneys.. 7 so long as the legislation stops short of
violating the separation of powers."5 8 Moreover, attorneys cannot escape
the reach of the common law by virtue of rules of ethics.5 9
Nevertheless, deletion of a reference to positive law is troubling. As
adopted, Rule 1.6 provides no hook for analyzing a contest between
positive law and the Rule. Practicing attorneys, experienced and
inexperienced alike, are wel aware of the strong prohibition against
disclosure of client information. Thus, a difficult issue arises when
positive law appears to require disclosure-especially when the duty
arises from the common law."6 Deletion of the Rule's reference to other
law minimizes the significance of positive law and reduces the
likelihood that an attorney will fully analyze the contest between the
duty of confidentiality and her obligations under statutory law or the
common law.'6 ' This puts attorneys in a "difficult position ''162 and may
create confusion and danger for third parties. The effect is intensified by
the Scope section of the Model Rules, which declares: "The lawyer's
exercise of discretion not to disclose information under Rule 1.6 should
not be subject to reexamination."'6 Certainly most attorneys would
156. See Hodes, supra note 129, at 758-60. "[F]ederal and state courts often state that the only
instances in which they are bound to treat the ethics rules as binding precepts are in disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers." Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L.
Rev. 1389, 1412 (1992).
157. See Koniak, supra note 156, at 1411-12.
158. "[lIt is safe to say little more than that a state could not constitutionally abolish the rule of
confidentiality or the attomey-client privilege in criminal cases." See 1 Hazard, Jr. & Hodes, supra
note 34, § 1.6:103, at 134.
159. See Legislative History, supra note 13, at 13 (noting that self-regulation must be adequate
to avoid government regulation). "[Tihe operation of law external to the law of lawyering-other
law-will sometimes 'force' further exceptions, regardless of what a disciplinary code might say."
1 Hazard, Jr. & Hodes, supra note 34, § 1.6:109, at 168.1-168.2 (Supp. 1996).
160. See 1 Hazard, Jr. & Hodes, supra note 34, § 1.6:113, at 168.9 (Supp. 1996) (noting that
attorney "may take the view that he is required by 'law,' namely tort law or criminal law, to
disclose preemptively client misdeeds in which the lawyer's services were used").
161. See Koniak, supra note 156, at 1413-15 (noting that Model Rules "contain no explicit
statement on the general hierarchy of norms" and even suggest "that the Rules provide the mega-
text for resolving conflicts with other law and thus constitute higher authority").
162. ABA/BNA Lawyers'Manual on Professional Conduct 55:1201 (1994) (stating that Rule 1.6
puts attorneys in "a much more difficult position" than was case under Model Code).
163. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Scope para. 20 (1994); Legislative History, supra
note 13, at 23. This comment is oddly reminiscent of the authority issues raised in Glendower's
boast to Hotspur, "I can call spirits from the vasty deep," and Hotspur's response, "Why, so can I;
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comply with a court order rather than face contempt of court. At any
rate, deletion of the acknowledgment of positive law and inclusion of the
above statement seeking to insulate attorney decisions fiom review are
strong evidence of the categorical nature of the prohibition against
disclosure.!"
5. Addition of "Imminent" To Qualify "Death"
The ABA House of Delegates amended the final rule, as a result of
debate at the 1983 mid-year meeting, by adding the word "imminent" to
modify "death."'1 65 The legislative history shows that Professor Hazard,
Reporter for the Model Rules, expressed the view that -the addition of
this modifier was unnecessary because the proposed standard took into
account the "realness and directness of the harm."'" That the qualifier
"imminent" is redundant does not mean, however, that its inclusion has
no effect. The set of reportable client information is narrowed by the
inclusion of the word "imminent." Inclusion of the modifier adds
another judgment call to an already difficult analysis, making the
attorney's choice to report less likely. The set of crimes resulting in
"imminent death" defines a smaller universe than those resulting in
"death," and mere threatened death does not justify reporting a crime
under the Rule. 167 Addition of the modifier renders a reasonable belief
that the client will kill another an insufficient predicate for disclosing
client information. Read literally, the final rule requires the attorney to
or so can any man; But will they come, when you do call for them?" William Shakespeare, The
First Part of Henry IV, act 3, sc. 1, 11. 53-55 (David Bevinston ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1987)
(1598).
164. See Koniak, supra note 156 (arguing that nomos of legal profession and that of state are at
odds and state lacks commitment necessary to govern legal profession).
165. See Legislative History, supra note 13, at 48-49.
166. See id at 49.
167. A qualifier limits the set of the noun it modifies. For example, the set "apples" is limited by
the qualifiers "red" or "yellow" or "poison." This rule of construction is true for all but the non-
exclusive adjectives such as "all" or "any." By traditional principles of interpretation a term should
be presumed to add to the effect of the rule; an interpretation that renders a term surplus is
disfavored. See, e.g., Kenerson v. FDIC, 44 F.3d 19, 23 (1st Cir. 1995); Salomon Forex, Inc. v.
Tauber, 8 F.3d 966, 975 (4th Cir. 1993) (noting that court "assume[s] that the legislature used
words that meant what it intended; that all words had a purpose and were meant to be read
consistently"); In re Village Bank & Trust Co., 471 A.2d 1187, 1188-89 (N.H. 1984).
Additionally, exceptions generally are read narrowly. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Clark, 489 U.S.
726, 727 (1989). Thus the term "imminent" should be seen as limiting the category of death that
triggers the exception. Here, the general rule of nondisclosure is set forth in Rule 1.6(a). The
exceptions are set forth in Rule 1.6(b) including an exception for threats to .commit a crime that
will result in "imminent death." See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(b) (1994).
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remain silent despite a client's stated intent to murder unless that murder
will be accomplished in the near future. Thus, the attorney appears to
have no discretion to report his client's intentional course of poisoning a
third party with arsenic or another cumulative poison until the attorney
reasonably believes that the next dose will be fatal.
6
The significance of the addition of "imminent," like other changes in
the Rule, is less important for its practical effect in a disciplinary
proceeding than in revealing the purpose and momentum of Rule 1.6-a
heightened admonition against disclosure and a strengthened ethic of
silence. The constriction of the category of harm deemed cognizable by
Rule 1.6 and adoption of the qualifier "imminent" is more noteworthy
when one considers the expansion *of the concept of harm in modem
law.1 69 The law has expanded to recognize harm and the need for
accountability for such harm even when the harm is remote in time from
the defendant's conduct that created the risk to the injured party. 7 '
Application of the Rule with its standard of "imminent death" is more
difficult in the environmental context. Does the Rule allow an attorney
to report information that the client's intended conduct creates a
statistical likelihood of killing a percentage of people exposed to a
hazardous substance? How high must the percentage of deaths be to
justify disclosure? Does the fact that the victims are not individually
identifiable other than as a percentage mean that disclosure is not
168. This hypothetical is not intended to suggest that a board of professional responsibility
would conclude that an attorney's decision to disclose the poisoning was a violation of the rle.
169. Recovery is allowed in modem tort law for a plaintiff whose life expectancy has been
shortened by a defendant's negligent or intentional conduct. See, e.g., Gideon v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1136 (5th Cir. 1985) (life expectancy reduced); May v. William
Beaumont Hosp., 448 N.W.2d 497, 567 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989). Additionally, that the harm
suffered by a plaintiff occurred after a long latency period will not necessarily defeat a plaintiffs
claim for damages under modem law. See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 134 F.RLD. 32
(D.N.Y. 1990) (staying suits to consider claims of asbestos-related injuries together); see also Clay
v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 722 F.2d 1289 (6th Cir. 1983) (finding asbestos actions exempt
from 10-year statute of limitations by retroactive application of 1979 Products Liability Act, Tenn.
Code Ann. § 29-28-103(b)); Jadiowski v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 661 A.2d 814 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (affirming compensatory damages but reversing amount of punitive
damages as excessive); Ripa v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 660 A.2d 521 (NJ. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1995) (affirming compensatory damages of over $380,000 for wrongful death from
asbestos exposure).
170. Asbestos cases provide examples of the expansion of liability. Recently the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the fact that plaintiffs have not yet experienced symptoms
of disease from exposure to asbestos does not mean their action for negligent infliction of
emotional damages should be dismissed. See Buckley v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 79 F.3d
1337 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 379 (1996); Asbestos: Baltimore Jury Awards $14 Million
on Behalf of Mechanics in Brake Lining Case, 11 Toxics L. Rptr. (BNA) 112 (June 26, 1996)
(reporting on Grewe v. Ford Motor Co., No. 96-112701 (Md. Cir. Ct. June 19, 1996)).
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allowed? Of course, not all people who are exposed to a hazardous
substance will die from the exposure. The designation of the hazardous
or toxic nature of a substance is, to a significant extent, a function of the
percentage of people or other organisms that will die or be affected
adversely by the substance.' Difficulties of proof of injury are one
reason that Congress and state legislatures have adopted the command
and control strategy of environmental laws to alleviate the dangers of
pollution to society.
IV. STATE MODIFICATIONS
The controversy engendered by Rule 1.6 in the ABA adoption process
continued when the states considered adoption of the Model Rules. Most
states have adopted the Model Rules, in an apparent move toward
uniformity. 72 Unfortunately, the goal of a uniform and clear-cut rule has
eluded the states. Only six jurisdictions enacted Model Rule 1.6
. 171. By focusing on this point, some have suggested that rather than regarding carcinogens as
hazardous, we should view those individuals who suffer ill effects of the substances as more
susceptible than others. Through this prism, poisons are not poisonous; rather some people are
allergic to them. See Sandra Blakeslee, Genes Tell Story of Why Some Get Cancer While Others
Don 't, N.Y. Times, May 17, 1994, at B6.
172. Thirty-nine jurisdictions have adopted the Model Rules, most with alterations to Rule 1.6.
See Ala. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (1996); Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 1.6 (Michie 1996); Ariz. Rules of Professional Conduct ER 1.6 (1996); Ark Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (Michie 1996); Colo. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6
(1996); Conn. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (1996); Del. Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 1.6 (1996); D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (1996); Fla. Rules of Professional
Conduct Rule 4-1.6 (1996); Haw. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (1995); Idaho Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (1996); 11. Rules of Professional Conduct Rtle 1.6 (West. 1996);
IndL Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (1996); Kan. Model Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 1.6 (1996); Ky. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (1996); La. Rules of Professional
Conduct Rule 1.6 (West 1996); Md Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (1996); Mich. Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (1996); Minn. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (1996); Miss.
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (1996); Mo. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6
(1996); Mont. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (1996); Nev. Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 156 (1995); N.H. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (1995); N.J. Rules of Professional
Conduct Rule (1996); N.M. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 16-106 (Michie 1996); N.C. Rules
of Professional Conduct Rule 4 (1996); N.D. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (1996); Okla.
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (1996); Pa. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6
(1996); I.L Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (1995); S.C. Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 1.6 (Law. Co-op 1996); S.D. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (Michie 1995); Tex.
Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.05 (1995); Utah Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 1.6 (1996); Wash. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (1996); W. Va. Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (1996); Wis. Rules of Professional Conduct SCR 20:1.6 (1996);
Wyo. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (Michie 1996).
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verbatim. 73 The modifications adopted by states range from dramatic
rejections"4 to minor adjustments. The failure to secure a uniform
confidentiality rule is a significant failure, especially because of the
clear need for public understanding of the duty of confidentiality.
At best, in the absence of an adequate set of model rules around
which the profession generally can coalesce, the several states will
end up with respective and non-uniform codes and the
fragmentation of the American Bar will be exacerbated. "The legal
profession" may soon disintegrate into fifty, or more, collections of
lawyers, each without a recognized right of self-regulation. 75
After over a decade of influence from the Model Rules, the legal
profession has not lost its power of self-regulation. 76 With regard to the
rule on confidentiality, however, much of the above prediction rings
true.'77 The scant empirical data on the Rule indicate that attorneys as
well as clients lack a clear understanding of the duty of
confidentiality. 7 The need for public knowledge and understanding of
the ethical rule is strongest in this area because the purpose of the Rule
173. These jurisdictions are Alabama, Ala. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6; Delaware,
Del. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (1996); Louisiana, La. Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 1.6; Missouri, Mo. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6; Montana, Mont. Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 1.6; Nevada, Nev. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 156. Rhode
Island added the words "but is not obligated" to modify "may . . . reveal." R.I. Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 1.6.
174. A good number of states simply restored the exceptions deleted by the ABA House of
Delegates from the Proposed Rule. See 2 Hazard, Jr. & Hodes, supra note 34, § AP4:104, at 1261
(Supp. 1994).
175. R.W. Nahstoll, The Lawyer's Allegiance: Priorities Regarding Confidentiality, 41 Wash. &
Lee L. Rev. 421,424-25 (1984).
176. Attorneys and bar associations naturally resist governmental regulation. They have
concerns that governmental regulation could turn the attorney into an administrative watchdog or
policeman of client. Failure to construct an ethical code that protects the interests of society
(including the cumulative interest of third parties) may put the profession on course for such
regulation, however.
177. Shelly Stucky Watson, Keeping Secrets that Harm Others: Medical Standards Illuminate
Lawyer's Dilemma, 71 Neb. L. Rev. 1123, 1129-30 (1992).
It is doubtful that clients fully understand the confidentiality rules as they now stand-if
indeed, the rules are explained to them at all. Even a lawyer who makes a good faith effort to
explain the rules and exceptions to a client will likely leave clients confused, at least as to the
details.
Id,
178. See Zacharias, supra note 1, at 396. For a summary of the empirical research in this area,
see Leslie C. Levin, Testing the Radical Experiment: A Study of Lawyer Response to Clients ho
Intend to Harm Others, 47 Rutgers L. Rev. 81, 102-06 (1994).
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is to encourage clients to seek representation and to disclose fully all the
relevant facts to their attorneys. 79
State modifications principally relate to the following elements of the
Rule: (1) the permissive nature of the rule; (2) the extension of
protection to all client "information"; (3) fraudulent client acts; (4)
financial interests of third parties; (5) the duty to rectify client fraud, (6)
the disclosure of future crimes; and (7) compliance with other law.'
Nine jurisdictions have made attorney disclosures of client
information mandatory in designated circumstances by substituting
"shall reveal" or similar language in place of the Rule's permissive
language "may reveal.''. The New Mexico rule states that a lawyer
"should reveal" client information when a client's crime is likely to
result in serious harm.' 2 At least three jurisdictions retained the scope
language of the Model Code ("confidences and secrets"), rejecting the
term "information."'' 3 Twenty-two jurisdictions have broadened the
category of "crime" that qualifies as an exception by deleting the
category of "imminent death.' '84 Of these jurisdictions fifteen have
179. The need for uniformity has increased because of public dissatisaetion and a public
sentiment that lawyers are preoccupied with self-interest-either their own or that of their clients.
In The Lost Lawyer, Dean Kronman chronicles the loss in the United States of the public image and
reality of the "lawyer-statesman." See Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the
Legal Profession 11-13 (1993).
180. Some states fit more than one category. See, e.g., Ariz. Rules of Professional Conduct ER
1.6 (1996); Haw. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (1995).
181. See Ariz. Rules of Professional Conduct ER 1.6; Conn. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule
1.6 (1996); Fla. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4-1.6 (1996); Haw. Rules of Professional
Conduct Rule 1.6; 1l. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (West 1996); Nev. Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 156 (1995); NJ. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (1996); N.D.
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (1996); Wis. Rules of Professional Conduct SCR 20:1.6
(1996). Additionally, although Virginia has retained the Model Code, the state requires disclosure
in specified circumstances. See Va. Code of Professional Responsibility DR 4-101(C), (D) (Michie
1996).
182. See N.M. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 16-106(B) (Michie 1996).
183. See e.g., D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (1996); Mich. Rules of Professional
Conduct Rule 1.6 (1996); Minn. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (1996).
184. See Ariz. Rules of Professional Conduct ER 1.6; Ark. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule
1.6(bX) (Michie 1996); Colo. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(b) ('1996); Fla. Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 4-1.6; Haw. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(cXI); Idaho Rules
of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (1996); il. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(b); Ind. Rules
of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (1996); Kan. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6
(1996); Md Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (1996); Mich. Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 1.6(cX4) (1996); Minn. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(bX3); Miss. Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(bXl) (1996); N.H. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (1995);
N.C. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4(cX4) (1996); Okla. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule
1.6(bXl) (1996); S.C. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(bXl) (1995); Tex. Disciplinary
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.05(cX7); Wash. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule
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broadened the exception further by rejecting the qualifier "substantial"
to the category of "bodily harm."'85 Eleven jurisdictions have added
protection for the financial interest of third parties by including this
interest within the exceptions to the prohibition. 8 6 Ten jurisdictions
include "fraudulent" as well as criminal acts within the exception for
harm, extending greater protection to third parties. 7 Thirteen
jurisdictions allow disclosures to "rectify fraud" when the, attorney's
services have been used to further the fraud.18  Fifteen jurisdictions
include an exception for disclosures to comply with other law.'89 These
1.6(bXl) (1996); W. Va. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(bXl) (1996); Wis. Rules of
Professional Conduct SCR 20:1.6(b); Wyo. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(bX1) (Michie
1996).
185. See Ark. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(bXl); Colo. Rules of Professional
Conduct Rule 1.6(b); Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6; Ill. Rules of Professional
Conduct Rule 1.6(b) (substituting "serious bodily harm" for substantial); Ind Rules of Professional
Conduct Rule 1.6; Kan. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6; Mich. Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(cX4); Minn. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(bX3); Miss.
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(bXl); N.C. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4(cX4);
Okla. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(bXl); S.C. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule
1.6(bXl); Wash. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(bXl); W. Va. Rules of Professional
Conduct Rule 1.6(bX 1); Wyo. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(bX1).
186. See Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (Michie 1996); Conn. Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (1996); Haw. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(cXl); Md.
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(bXl); NJ. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(bXl);
N.H. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(bXl); N.M. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 16-
106(C); N.D. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(bX1) (1996); Pa. Rules of Professional
Conduct Rule 1.6(bXl) (1996); Utah Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(bXl) (1996); Wis.
Rules of Professional Conduct SCR 20:1.6.
187. See Alaska Rules ofProfessional Conduct Rule 1.6(a); Haw. Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 1.6(cXl); Md Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(bX4); Mich. Rules of Professional
Conduct Rule 1.6(cX3); N.J. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(bXI); N.D. Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(d); Okla. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(bX2); Tex.
Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.05(cX7); Utah Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 1.6(bX2); Wis. Rules of Professional Conduct SCR 20: 1.6(b).
188. See Conn. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(cX2); Haw. Rules of Professional
Conduct Rule 1.6(cX2); Md Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(bX2); Mich. Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (cX3); Minn. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(bX4); N.J.
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(cXl); N.D. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(f);
Okla. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(bX2); Pa. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule
1.6(cX2); S.D. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(cX3) (1995); Tex. Disciplinary Rules
of Professional Conduct Rule 1.05(cX8); Utah Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(bX2); Wis.
Rules of Professional Conductfor Attorneys SCR 20:1.6(cXl).
189. See D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(dX2XA), (B); Haw. Rules of Professional
Conduct Rule 1.6(cX6); Il. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(cXl); Kan. Model Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(bX2); Ky. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(bX3) (1996);
Me Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(bX4); Mich. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule
1.6(cX2); Minn. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(bX2); Miss. Rules of Professional
Conduct Rule 1.6(c); NXJ Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(cX3); N.C. Rules of Professional
Conduct Rule 4(cX3); N.D. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(g); Okla. Rules of Professional
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state departures from Model Rule 1.6 are evidence of state
dissatisfaction with the ABA's position on confidentiality.
V. TWO VIEWS OF THE PROFESSION
The underlying view of the proper role of the lawyer influences
dramatically the way attorneys regard the duty of confidentiality. Two
views predominate the scholarship and institutional statements of what it
means to be an attorney in this society: (1) the lawyer as champion, and
(2) the lawyer as officer of the court.
A. The Lawyer as Champion
One conceptualization of the lawyer focuses on the intrinsic value of
confidentiality,' 9 taking the view that the relationship of the attorney to
the client is an absolute value, integral to the right of fair
representation. 9' This view is premised on the belief that the duty of
confidentiality is a nonnegotiable element of our judicial system that
must not be overridden except in cases so dramatic that reporting should
occur in spite of any rule. It assumes that releasing the attorney's pledge
of silence endangers the protections of the advocacy system of justice.
The image of lawyer as champion or special friend to the client is
powerful. The lawyer provides more than comfort. He comes at a time
when the client is in greatest need. At risk of losing money, property,
liberty, or even life at the hands of the judicial system, the client looks to
the attorney. This narrative is particularly compelling in the case of
Conduct Rule 1.6(c); Tex. Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(cX4); Utah Rules
of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6. Like the Model Rule jurisdictions that made this change, Code
states also recognize the attorney's right to disclose information to comply with other law. See,
e.g., Ga. Code of Professional Responsibility DR 4-101(CX2) (1996); Iowa Code of Professional
Responsibility for Lawyers DR 4-101(CX2) (1996); Mass. Code of Professional Responsibility DR
4-101 (CX2) (1996); Neb. Code of Professional Responsibility DR 4-101(C2) (West 1995); N.Y.
Code of Professional Responsibility DR 4-101(CX2) (1995); Ohio Code of Professional
Responsibility DR 4-101(CX2) (Banks-Baldwin 1996); Or. Code of Professional Responsibility DR
4-101 (CX2) (1996); Tenn. Code of Professional Responsibility DR 4-101(CX2) (1995); Vt. Code
of Professional Responsibility DR 4-101 (CX2) (1995); Va. Code of Professional Responsibility DR
4-101 (CX2) (1996).
190. In fact, the arguments for the amoral role of the attorney are more diverse than this brief
summary can impart. See, e.g., Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense,
a Problem, and Some Possibilities, in The Ethics of Lawyers 57 (David Lubzn ed., 1994); Charles
Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 Yale L.J.
1060 (1976).
191. See Abraham Abramovsky, A Case for Increased Confidentiality, 13 Fordham Urban L.J.
11(1984-1985).
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criminal defendants. 92 In this model-whether in the criminal or civil
context-the lawyer offers a nonjudgmental ear similar to that
associated with the psychotherapist or priest. She also offers the skills
necessary to serve the client in a complex system of justice. She is as
much savior as champion, an alter ego with the skills of Portia93 but
with no interest in judging the client's motives or actions.
The view of the attorney as champion has long historical precedent.
Courts, scholars, and boards of professional responsibility speak of the
lawyer's duty of "single allegiance,"'" "absolute loyalty,"' 95  and
"undivided fidelity"'" to the client.
When a client engages the services of a lawyer in a given piece of
business he is entitled to feel that, until that business is finally
disposed of in some manner, he has the undivided loyalty of the
one upon whom he looks as his advocate and his champion. 97
While this view has gained momentum in an age of relativism,'98 the
relationship of client and attorney appears always to have inspired strong
and sometimes florid praise. 99 Though stated in terms of the attorney's
192. See generally Bruce A. Green, Zealous Representation Bound: The Intersection of the
Ethical Codes and the Criminal Law, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 687 (1991).
193. See generally William Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice.
194. See, e.g., American Employers Ins. Co. v. Goble Aircraft Specialties, Inc., 131 N.Y.S.2d
393,401 (1954).
195. See Steven H. Goldberg, The Former Client's Disqualification Gambit: A Bad Move in
Pursuit of an Ethical Anomaly, 72 Minn. L. Rev. 227, 235 (1987). "A lawyer's duty of absolute
loyalty to his client's interests does not end with his retainer. He is enjoined for all time ... from
disclosing matters revealed to him by reason of the confidential relationship." Id (quoting T.C.
Theater Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1953)).
196. See Canons of Professional Ethics Canon 6 (1908) ("The obligation to represent the client
with undivided fidelity and not to divulge his secrets or confidences forbids also the subsequent
acceptance of retainers or employment from others in matters adversely affecting any interest of the
client with respect to which confidence has been reposed."); see also e.g., Moritz v. Medical
Protective Co., 428 F. Supp. 865, 872 (D. Ind. 1977) (quoting ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics
and Grievances, Formal Op. 282 (1950)); Parsons v. Continental Nat'l Am. Group, 550 P.2d 94
(Ariz. 1976).
197. Grievance Comm. v. Rottner, 203 A.2d 82, 84 (Conn. 1964).
198. Chief Justice Burger asserts that we apply "the flawed notion of relativism to the law
profession-with evil and unnecessary consequences." Warren E. Burger, Where Some Rascals Are
Taking Our Law Profession, Preface to Peter Megargee Brown, Rascals: The Selling of the Legal
Profession 9 (1989).
199. See United States v. Costen, 38 F. 24,24 (C.C.D. Colo. 1889). As the court described:
[I]t is the glory of our profession that its fidelity to its client can be depended on; that a man
may safely go to a lawyer and converse with him upon his rights or supposed rights in any
litigation with the absolute assurance that lawyer's tongue is tied from ever disclosing it; and
any lawyer who proves false to such an obligation, and betrays or seeks to betray any
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overall duty rather than with specific reference to confidentiality, Lord
Brougham's famous quote identifies loyalty to the client as the absolute
duty of the attorney:
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person
in all the world, and that person is his client. To save faat client by
all means and expedients, and at all hazards and ccsts to other
persons, and amongst them, to himself, is his first and only duty;
and in performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the
torments, the destruction which he may bring upon others.
Separating the duty of a patriot from that of an advocate, he must
go on reckless of consequences, though it should be his unhappy
fate to involve his country in confusion."o
Lord Brougham's explication of the attorney's highest (and indeed
"only") duty presents a religious (almost romantic) zeal for the notion 'of
loyalty to the client.20' But this statement's rhetorical force outweighs its
content. Although the cost of loyalty is stated in dramatic terms
("destruction" and "confusion"), the context for the statement is
Brougham's world, a time in which standards "reckless of the
consequences" posed lesser risks than today. In short, the rhetoric
predated the nuclear and chemical age we inhabit. At an), rate, the more
typical justification for the intrinsic view of confidentiality2 2 focuses not
information or any facts that he has attained while employed on the one side, is guilty of the
grossest breach of trust.
Id.
200. David Mellinkoff, The Conscience of a Lawyer 189 n.10 (1973) (quoting from second trial
of Queen Caroline in 1821). For background on the trial of Britain's Queen Caroline, which gave
rise to Lord Brougham's famous statement, see Hazard, Jr., supra note 40, at 1244 (noting that
Lord Brougham's statement related to his representation of Queen in divorce a-tion brought against
her by King of England and that, as Queen's attorney, Brougham intended tc defend Queen, with
countercharges that would jeopardize King's title to throne).
201. To the extent that the ethic of silence is based on something other than social utility, a
principle of individual allegiance on the order of that expressed by Lord Brougham, then it is in
society's interest to take a more active role in regulating the legal profession.
[C]laims to individual and social utility touch on the raison d'6tre of the professions
themselves; but they are also potentially treacherous. For if it were found that a professional
group or subspeciality not only did not help but actually hurt individuals, and increased the
social burden of, say, illness or crime, then there would be a strong case for not allowing it to
promise professional confidentiality. To question its special reason for being able to promise
confidentiality of unusual strength is therefore seen as an attack on its special purposes, and on
the power it acquires in being able to give assurances beyond those which non-professionals
can offer.
Bok, supra note 8, at 122.
202. See Model Rules of Professional Responsibility pmbl. para. 10 (1994).
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simply on cleaving to the client but on the transcendent2 3 benefit to the
public interest.2"
B. The Lawyer as Officer of the Court
The concept of the attorney as an officer of the court?" is also old and
meaningful.2" Lawyers traditionally were viewed as the guardians of the
law, serving the social good.07 Some scholars suggest that the lawyer is
not only an officer of the court but also an "officer of the law" and a
"Guardian of Due Process." 208 Rather than rejecting in toto the champion
model of the attorney's role, the lawyer-as-officer model simply rejects
the absolute form of the champion concept.2' It incorporates the concept
203. Lawyers answer the charge that they subjugate morality to the needs of the client, by
arguing that loyalty to the client serves "an institutional justice higher than conventional morality."
William Simon, The Ideology of.Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis.
L. Rev. 29,308.
204. The statement is in contrast to the utilitarian justification set forth in the Model Rules. See
supra Part III.
205. See Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers as Officers of the Court, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 39 (1989).
Professor Gaetke charges that the title is now disingenuous and misleading to the public. He urges
the profession to "abandon the characterization" or "adopt... duties [that] give meaning to the role
of officer of the court." Id at 90-91.
206. By this, the author does not intend to assert that the meaning is clear. Although this phrase
has been employed to describe the role of attorneys for generations, its legal significance is far
from certain. See Wolfram, supra note 32, at 17-18. Wolfram argues that the term connotes few
special privileges, but may carry with it special burdens such as higher standards of honor andintegrity. Id.
207. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 250 (1943) ('Ours is
a learned profession, not a mere money-getting trade."). A U.S. Supreme Court Justice also noted
the role of the legal profession in Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988):
One distinguishing feature of any profession ... is that membership entails an ethical
obligation to temper one's selfish pursuit of economic success by adhering to standards of
conduct that could not be enforced either by legal fiat or through the discipline of the
market.... Both the special privileges incident to membership in the profession and the
advantages those privileges give in the necessary task of earning a living are means to a goal
that transcends the accumulation of wealth. That goal is public service.
Id. at 488-89 (O'Connor, I. dissenting); see also Sandra Day O'Connor, Foreword to Rudolph J.
Gerber, Lawyers, Courts, and Professionalism at xi, xi-xii (1989). See generally Samuel Haber,
The Questfor Authority and Honor in the American Professions 1750-1900 (1991).
208. See Lawry, supra note 55, at 318-19,326.
209. See Wolfram, supra note 32, § 6.7.3, at 301; Lawry, supra note 55, at 326-35. Wolfram
states:
mhe normal expectation of lawyer loyalty to a client's interests is hardly an absolute. It does
not purport to be a reason why a lawyer must always maintain silence regardless of the claims
and interests of third persons.... [A] lawyer's dutiful silence about a client's intention to
commit a serious crime might cause such a risk of a harm to another person that the normal
prohibition against voluntary disclosure should yield.
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of attorney as champion, but qualifies the role of attorney on the
utilitarian basis of service to society and the system of justice. The focus
of this model is the obligation of the attorney to the system as a whole:
the champion must play by the rules. While recognizing the attorney has
a duty of loyalty to the client,"' this model sets limits on the duty,
reminding us that the attorney's duty has never been to win at all costs.
The attorney has no duty to keep the client's secrets, for example, if to
keep quiet would perpetrate fraud on the court."
VI. THE ATTORNEY-CHAMPION OF THE MODEL RULES
The above views of the attorney's role are more than theoretical.
They are the wellspring for choice and action. While each attorney
makes personal choices regarding his role as a p:rofessional, the
institutional statement of ethical rules set forth in the Model Rules has
special significance. It influences the views of individual attorneys
regarding what it means to be an attorney. By virtue of its adoption in
individual jurisdictions, it invests the standard with regulatory force that
can result in sanctions against the attorney whose personal code differs
from it.
The two views of the attorney's role set forth above cannot be
harmonized. One (officer) is a qualification of the other (champion).
Thus, any analytical statement of professional conduct must incorporate
principally one view or the other to provide a consis,:ent framework.
This part of the Article looks to the Model Rules and finds that the
concept of the attorney-champion is the major force shaping its
standards.
The Preamble to the Model Rules identifies the conflicting interests to
be addressed by the rules of ethics and notes the function of the Model
Rules.
Wolfram, supra note 32, § 6.7.3, at 301.
210. See Wolfram, supra note 32, § 4.1, at 146.
211. See generally Michael K. McChrystal, Lawyers and Loyalty, 33 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 367
(1992). Under the Model Code, the attorney's duty of confidentiality does not mean the attorney
should stand by silently while a client commits fraud on the court or on another individual. See
Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 4-101 (1980). Under the earlier canons, the "office
of attorney does not permit, much less does it demand of him for any client, violation of law or any
manner of fraud or chicane. He must obey his own conscience and not that of his client." Canons of
Professional Ethics Canon 15 (1908). The Model Rules also require revelations to prevent fraud on
the court. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rules 1.2(d), 1.16(b)(1), 3.3 (1994).
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In the nature of law practice ... conflicting responsibilities are
encountered. Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from
conflict between a lawyer's responsibilities to clients, to the legal
system and to the lawyer's own interest in remaining an upright
person .... The Rules of Professional Conduct prescribe terms for
resolving such conflicts. Within the framework of these Rules,
many difficult issues of professional discretion can arise. Such
issues must be resolved through the exercise of sensitive
professional and moral judgment guided by the basic principles
underlying the Rules.212
This Preamble statement sets forth both the scope of its authority and the
process of decision-making on ethical conflicts with subtlety. The range
of its prescriptions is plenary: it resolves "such conflicts," referring to
the problems described above ("all difficult ethical problems").
Decisions about conflicts are entrusted to two factors: "sensitive
professional and moral judgment" and the "basic principles" of the
Model Rules. The influence of the Model Rules is stated obliquely:
resolution of conflicts occurs through the attorney's "sensitive"
judgment as it is "guided" by the Model Rules--or rather (more
obliquely) by the "basic principles" found "underlying" the Model
Rules. The structure of this sentence allows the reader to lose track of
the relative weight of these factors. When personal judgment and the
Model Rules diverge, the Model Rules must control.1 3 Of necessity, a
rule must control what is or is not a violation of the norm it establishes.
Thus, despite the above language, the attorney's exercise of judgment is
merely an application of the edicts of the Model Rules.
Although the Model Rules do not declare outright their vision of the
attorney's role, the range of action allowed for attorneys makes clear
that the Model Rules view of the attorney is predominantly that of the
attorney-champion. Rule 1.2 forbids the attorney to counsel or assist a
client in fraudulent or criminal conduct.2 4 Rule 1.16 requires the
attorney to withdraw or to refuse to represent anyone when the
representation will result in a violation of the professional rules or the
law.2 5 These rules require that the attorney disassociate himself from a
212. Model Rules of Professional Conduct pmbl. para. 8 (1994).
213. The attorney will have her own judgment (and a view or personal code) but it lacks the
force of the view adopted by the institution. In the same way each of us can have an opinion about
a case. But it is the court's "opinion" that has the force of law.
214. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.2.
215. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.16.
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client once he knows the client's criminal or fraudulent purpose (another
question that can be murky). But neither rule declares an affirmative
duty to rectify the harm or to warn others of the danger created by the
client.216 The attorney must back away from wrongful conduct but
protection of the system or individuals is subjugated by the model of the
champion. Thus, the attorney's loyalty is tied to the immediate interests
of the client; he must do nothing to compromise the client's interest
even when the client poses danger to others.217
The Model Rules seek to confine the attorney's analysis of disclosure
issues to the universe they construct. Deletion of references to
disclosures required by other law obscures the backdrop of substantive
law and its relation to the attorney's decision, suggesting that the stage
occupied by Rule 1.6 provides a full inquiry.2 " Additionally, the Model
Rules declare that the attorney's decision to refrain from disclosing
client information "should not be subject to reexamination." 219 This
declaration is presumably directed to the boards of professional
responsibility and the judiciary, since these are the forums for
reexamination of attorney conduct. In a similar vein, the Scope
statement of the Model Rules asserts that disclosure "may be judicially
compelled only in accordance with recognized exceptions to the
attorney-client and work product privileges." '  This statement
presupposes the litigation context for any confidentiality issue and
narrows the influence of positive law to two evidentiary issues.
216. The line drawn by these rules shows how the Model Rules have evolved away from the
concept of the attorney as a counselor who points out "those factors which may lead to a decision
that is morally just as well as legally permissible!' Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC
7-8 (1980).
217. Harm to another is insufficient to require disclosure. The interest in being free from danger
is not sufficient to require disclosures. Only when the danger to another coalesces with the most
culpable client conduct is disclosure within the discretion of the attorney. Yee supra note 77 and
accompanying text.
218. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 cmt. 20 (1994). The Model Code
specifically noted the predominance of positive law in its text. See Model Code of Professional
Responsibility DR 4-101(CX2) (1980).
219. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Scope para. 20 (1994). The proposed final draft
of section 1 17A of the Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers levels the field to some
extent, declaring that either decision (disclosure or silence) should not be mexamined. Restatement
(Third) of Law Governing Lawyers § 117A (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 199-5).
220. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Scope para. 19 (1994).
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VII. CONFIDENTIALITY AND CATASTROPHES: WEIGHING THE
RISKS
Several "givens" operate in the area of confidentiality regardless of
the precise wording of the rule. The first is obvious: only information
known to the attorney can be disclosed. The second is related: few
people declare their intention to commit a crime-to their attorneys or to
anyone." Third, the lawyer faces a difficult balancing process, no
matter what language the rule on confidentiality employs. Risk is a
function consequence and probability. The level of certainty regarding
each factor will vary from case to case. When a client threatens peril, the
lawyer must assess both the gravity of the harm threatened and the
likelihood that it will occur. Although indeterminacy makes for difficult
judgment calls, tort principles require that all professionals,'m and
indeed all people, make just such difficult judgment calls in just such an
indeterminate world.' The attorney, like the reasonable person, must
make the determination to the best of his abilities, based on the facts
known at the time.224
The system of belief presented in the Model Rules assumes a world in
which the harm perpetrated by any individual client has a limited sphere.
The Model Rules' preference for the risk of improvident silence over the
risk of improvident disclosure is implicit in the structure of Rule 1.6.
This preference is evidenced by the Model Rules' elevation of a
subsidiary aspect of social utility, the duty of confidentiality. 5
221. Proponents of a broad prohibition against disclosure focus on an increasing number of
revelations made to attorneys based on a belief that attorneys will successfully counsel against
harmful conduct.
222. The Court recognizes that it may be difficult for medical professionals to predict whether
a particular mental patient may pose a danger to himself or others. This factor alone,
however, does not justify barring recovery in all situations. The standard of care for
health professionals adequately takes into account the difficult nature of the problem
facing psychotherapists.
Durflinger v. Artiles, 727 F.2d 888, 904 (10th Cir. 1984) (imposing duty on hospitals to guard
against patients' dangerous mental conditions discoverable by exercise of reasonable care); see
also Foley v. Bishop Clarkson Mem'l Hosp., 173 N.W.2d 881, 884 (Neb. 1970).
223. Arguably attorneys are better prepared to make such judgment calls than other
professionals because of their legal training. See, e.g., Gary L. Blasi, hat Lawyers Know:
Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the Functions of Theory, 45 J. Legal Educ. 313
(1995) (concluding that core activities of lawyering are problem-solving and decision-making).
224. See Watson, supra note 177, at 1132 (arguing that "inaccuracy in predicting violence"
should not preclude duty to warn in clear cases).
225. The Rule invests the subsidiary principle (confidentiality) with conclusive effect, making it
a surrogate for social utility. By generalizing the good of confidentiality, the Rule's analysis
substitutes the surrogate for the principle and justifies the belief that confidentiality always serves
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The ABA's decision to reduce the likelihood of disclosure is based on
an intuitive assessment of the harm that could result from disclosures
against a client's interest. Rule 1.6 is evidence of a general aversion to
the risk of improvident disclosures." Although the Rule implicitly
prefers the risk of improvident silence to the risk of improvident
disclosure, there is nothing in the legislative history or the Model Rules
suggesting that the delegates considered the corollary risk of silence.
Because the modem world presents more opportunities for
environmental catastrophes and widespread harm,227 the debate on
confidentiality must now assess the overlooked risk of improvident
silence, the danger that significant harm can befall individuals or even
the entire community. Ultimately, the evolving debate should consider
the social utility of any formulation of the Rule, including assessment of
both disclosure and silence."8 The risk of improvident disclosure under a
viable exception for peril must be weighed against the risk of
improvident silence under the current rule.
A. The Risk ofImprovident Disclosures
The element of indeterminacy may have influenced the ABA to adopt
the categorical prohibition of Rule 1.6-as insurance against attorneys
revealing client confidences in circumstances that do not present true
peril. Rule 1.6 refuses to acknowledge the possibility that disclosure
the public good. However, any benefit is merely theoretical, and the focus on the surrogate of
confidentiality destroys social utility when the harm is extreme.
226. A similar phenomenon can be seen in the EPA's treatment of "old" (established)
environmental risks in comparison with "new" (emerging) risks. In Reducing Risk: Setting
Priorities and Strategies for Environmental Protection, the Science Advisory Board compared the
EPA's treatment of established risks with newly recognized risks and found the EPA prefers the
established risk. For such risks, the EPA sets standards. In the case of newly developed risks, by
contrast, the EPA is more likely to use "screening," which denies industry the right to create the
risk until it establishes the relative safety of the product. See Science Advisory Bd., Environmental
Protection Agency, Reducing Risk: Setting Priorities and Strategies for Environmental Protection
(1990), reprinted in Kenneth A. Manaster, Environmental Protection and Justice: Readings and
Commentary on Environmental Law and Practice 66,71 (1995).
227. The American public and legislatures now expect and demand heightened protection from
environmental dangers as a matter of policy. J. William Futrell, Presiden, Environmental Law
Institute, noted the change: "Environmental law's greatest achievement is its codification of a
change in ethics-a legal recognition that in the second half of the 20th c.tury, individual and
governmental responsibility extends to the natural world. Congress has adofted ecological values
as national goals." The Green Hasn't Faded After 25 Years, Nat'l L.J., June 19, 1995, at Cl.
228. Environmental professionals might call this analysis a risk assessment plan.
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could be appropriate in some circumstances. 9 This regulatory
scheme," ° like the counsel of the senior partner in the Auchincloss
story,23l  advocates a result rather than providing guidance. 2
Consequently, an assessment of the likelihood of improvident
disclosures and the resulting diminution of the public perception that
attorneys keep confidences is necessary. Whether the creation of a
viable normative-based exception to the prohibition against disclosure
will result in improvident disclosures by attorneys depends on more than
the Rule itself. Confidentiality occupies such a central place in the world
of attorneys that improvident disclosure seems unlikely.
The duty is deeply ingrained in society's way of regarding attorneys;
it is a central part of the attorney's public persona and of the individual
self-image of most attorneys. Preservation of client confidences is the
strongest professional norm of attorneys; both attorneys and legal
scholars consider preservation of the client's secrets the first
commandment of the practice of law. 3 The group culture of attorneys
demands silence, 4  projecting an ethos of almost religious
proportions." Additionally, the attorney's close connection with the
cliente' and the client's interest can make disclosure almost
229. No illustrative case is provided in the comments or preamble to show the correct operation
of the exception-perhaps for fear that to acknowledge a duty to disclose peril might result in cases
of improvident disclosures based on too insignificant a threat.
230. Rules of professional conduct are not generally spoken of as regulations. Nevertheless, they
serve to regulate the profession. "To the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their
professional calling, the occasion for government regulation is obviated." Model Rules of
Professional Conduct pmbl. para. 10 (1994).
231. See Auchincloss, supra note 128, at 194, 210-11.
232. "Moral questions are often too complex and multifaceted to lend themselves to rule-bound
solutions. But if basic premises, legal rules, and the analysis of relevant factors are not
determinative, where does the lawyer turn?" Pepper, supra note 113, at 1607 (citations omitted).
233. Wolfram, supra note 32, § 6.1.4, at 247 ('Too often judges and commentators treat the
matter as if the only consideration worth discussing were [sic] the protection of client
confidentiality.").
234. On the strength of craft norms, see Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial
Incentives and Indeterminacy in Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 Duke L.J.
1051, 1058-72 (1995).
235. See 2 Hazard, Jr. & Hodes, supra note 34, § AP4:105, at 1265 (noting New Jersey's
experiment requiring fuller disclosure may founder because of view that adversary system is
"sacred!).
236. One of the historical justifications of the duty of confidentiality was that the lawyer is the
client's servant. See Comment, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals:
Its Implications for the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 Yale L.J. 1226, 1228-29 (1962).
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unthinkable.97 The natural tendency of attorneys (and people in general)
to identify with the causes and viewpoints they represent is another
powerful motivator. 8 Although most people feel. a sense of
identification and loyalty to employers and clients, such identification
appears to run deeper in the law where clients often think of their lawyer
as the "champion" on their "side" and lawyers view their roles as
"protecting" clients and defeating "opponents."
Often attorneys develop personal relationships with clients that
enhance this identification. They also have a sense of accountability to
clients, especially when the client is a powerful individual or corporation
that provides significant revenues to the attorney or her firm." The need
to pay bills and an aversion to controversy at the personal level also
discourages disclosure. The desire to put aside, defer, or ignore hard
choices is a natural inclination of most people, not only of attorneys.
Nondisclosure is the path of least resistance, the "easier" choice because
it is passive. The attorney's decision is generally hidden from scrutiny.
In most cases-whether they are environmental accidents or murders-
no one knows what the attorney knew and when she knew it. Finally,
liability issues come into play. When an attorney considers disclosing
client information, he will surely consider the possibility that his client
237. The view that the duty of confidentiality has intrinsic value (as opposed to the instrumental
value) adds support to the choice of nondisclosure regardless of the risks to third parties or the
public. See Fried, supra note 35.
238. Cf Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.2 cmt. 3 (1994) (noting that "represent[ion
of ] a client does not constitute approval of the client's views or activities"). This concept is
essential to the role of attorneys in insuring representation for all parties. See Charles W. Wolfram,
A Lawyer's Duty to Represent Clients, Repugnant and Otherwise, The Good Lawyer: Lawyers'
Roles and Lawyers' Ethics 214 (David Luban ed., 1983); Wolfram, supra note 32, § 10.2.3, at
576-78. The need for and reality of this concept does not destroy the human inclination to identify
with the views one represents, however. This phenomenon is recognized by jurisdictions that
prohibit issue conflicts. See, e.g., John S. Dzienkowski, Positional Conflicts ofInterest, 71 Tex. L.
Rev. 457 (1993). The response to proposed Rule 1.6 provides an example of identification with
client interests.
The American Trial Lawyers Association (ATLA) was so outraged by the Kutak
Commission's work, particularly its proposals on confidentiality, that it drafted a complete
alternative, the American Lawyer's Code of Conduct (ALCC). The Preface to the ALCC
states: "Our first principle remains that a client must be able to confide absolutely in a lawyer,
or there may be little point in anyone's having a lawyer. We have rejected one concept that the
Kutak Commission apparently espouses, that lawyers have a general duty to do good for
society that often overrides their specific duty to serve their clients."
Koniak, supra note 156, at 1442 (quoting ALCC Preface).
239. Corporate counsel may be more likely than retained counsel to learn of hazardous releases
and the potential for environmental disasters simply because they are more likely to be aware of the
day-to-day operations of a plant or hazardous waste facility.
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will sue him for his breach of loyalty if his decision turns out to be
wrong.
Together, the above factors reduce significantly the likelihood of
improvident or frivolous disclosures. Nevertheless, some risk of
disclosure remains. This risk must be balanced against the need for a
viable exception when significant hazards are threatened.
B. Improvident Silence and Environmental Catastrophes
The scenario of widespread disaster is instructive in a modem world.
Today devastating harm is a real risk rather than a nightmare fantasy.2'
Although the United States has not experienced a nuclear disaster of the
magnitude of Chemobyl, the Three Mile Island disaster241 raises
concerns about the use of nuclear energy.242 Hazardous substances
present a separate danger. 3 Millions of tons of hazardous substances are
produced each year in this country by private industry,2 4 federal
240. See S. Rep. No. 101-228, at 134 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3519.
Moreover, world destruction is, unfortunately, also a legitimate possibility. In cases of nuclear
threats, an attorney's choice should be in favor of saving the planet rather than preserving the client
confidence-even under the intrinsic view of the duty of confidentiality. The costs to the legal
system can be outweighed by the physical costs of disaster. After all, you need a world in order to
have a legal system.
241. See Radiation Exposure: Three Mile Island Accident May Have Injured People Living Near
Reactor, Cancer Wkly. Plus, Aug. 26, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Cancer Weekly Plus File;
Three Mile Island Suits Dismissed by U.S. Judge, Wall St. J., June 10, 1996, at A5 (describing
dismissal of claims of more than 2000 people).
242. Although some argue that a Chemobyl-type disaster is not possible in the United States,
see, e.g., Andrew Melnykovych, Chernobyl Filled Prescription for Disaster that Couldn't Be
Written in U.S., Louisville Courier-J., Apr. 21, 1996, at S12, others doubt the safety of U.S. nuclear
power plants. See, e.g., Blaine Harden, Nuclear Reactions, Wash. Post, May 5, 1996, at W12
(reporting federal estimate of cleanup costs for Hanford nuclear site is $230 billion over 75 years);
see also Eric Pooley, Nuclear Warriors: Two Gutsy Engineers in Connecticut Have Caught the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission at a Dangerous Game That it Has Played for Years: Routinely
Waiving Safety Rules To Let Plants Keep Costs Down and Stay Online, Time, Mar. 4, 1996, at 46,
46.
243. Despite recent declines in toxic releases, the amount of toxic substances released into the
air and water are substantial: 2.26 billion pounds in 1994. See Emergency Planning: Toxic
Chemical Releases Decrease By 8.6 Percent in 1994, Report Says, 27 Env't Rptr. (BNA) 531 (July
5, 1996); see also Deeann Glamser, Plan to Incinerate Nerve Gas Sets Off Alarms, USA Today,
Mar. 30, 1996, at 8A.
244. "Despite considerable uncertainty, most estimates of the amount of RCRA hazardous waste
generated by the civilian sector are around 250 million tons per year." Michael B. Gerrard, Whose
Backyard, Whose Risk- Fear and Fairness in Toxic and Nuclear Waste Siting 8 (1994) (citing U.S.
Gen. Accounting Off., Pub. No. GAO/PEMD-90-3, Hazardous Waste: EPA's Generation and
Management Data Need Further Improvement (Feb. 1990); Review ofEPA's Capacity Assurance
Program: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Eniironment, Energy and Natural Resources of the
House Comm. on Government Operations, 101st Cong., 8 (1991)).
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facilities,24 hospitals, clinics, physicians' offices,2 6 and other sources.247
Because of the dramatic risks posed by these sources, the next mass
murderer may be the perpetrator of an environmental crime.248
Although the threat of widespread disaster249 presents the extreme
(and perhaps easiest) case, any known threat of an environmental
catastrophe tests the duty of confidentiality. These threats dramatize the
competing interest of public safety. Does Rule 1.6 sufficiently protect
the interests of workers and area residents when negligent work
practices set the stage for a chemical catastrophe? If imminent danger
exists, should the right to disclose the danger turn on whether the client
conduct is classified as criminal or merely fraudulent or negligent?' 0
The answers to these questions require revision to Rule 1.6.
245. See Emergency Planning: Toxic Chemical Releases Decrease By 8.6 Percent in 1994,
Report Says, supra note 243 (noting that federal facilities reported releases cf toxic substances in
1994 of 9.8 million pounds). Hazardous wastes also contribute to the problem. "The U.S. military
generates approximately 700,000 tons of hazardous wastes annually, including such substances as
paint thinner, spilled solvents, hydraulic fuel, aviation fuel, fuel tank and sewage sludges, and
herbicides." Gerrard, supra note 244, at 15 (citing Michael Satchell, Uncle Sawn's Toxic Folly, U.S.
News & World Rep., Mar. 27, 1989, at 20, 20). The U.S. government has "caused some of the
worst environmental disasters known," according to one commentator. See Eric W. Orts, Reflexive
Environmental Law, 89 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1227, 1319 (1995).
246. "Approximately 500,000 tons of regulated medical waste are generated each year by about
380,000 generators, such as hospitals, clinic, and physicians' offices." Gerrard, supra note 244, at
21. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia has ordered the EPA to establish new
source performance standards for medical waste incinerators for pollutants. See Air Pollution: Time
Sought by EPA to Reassess, Revamp Air Act Rule for Medical Waste Incinerctors, 26 Env't Reptr.
(BNA) 2331 (Apr. 12, 1996) (reporting EPA's attempt to delay court-ordered deadlines).
247. Not all of these chemical substances are regulated.
Approximately 80,000 chemicals are in commercial use today, and about 1,000 more are
introduced each year. Only a few hundred chemicals and specified mixtures of chemicals are
regulated under the hazardous waste laws. Of the remainder, only a small fraction have been
thoroughly tested for toxicity, and there is no doubt that many chemicals outside the regulatory
net pose serious hazards.
Gerrard, supra note 245, at 7 (citing Bruce W. Piasecki & Gary A. Davis, America's Future in
Toxic Waste Management: Lessons From Europe 4 (1987)).
248. According to Jefferson and Gilpin Counties' district attorney, Donald Mielke, who testified
before the Senate Subcommittee on Toxic Substances, "an environmental criminal could become
the next mass murderer, even though the cancers, birth defects and other problems he causes may
take years to appear." See Theodore M. Hammett & Joel Epstein, U.S. Dept. of Justice: Local
Prosecution of Environmental Crime 7 (June 1993); see also Nancy L. Quackenbush, Comment,
The Personal Injury Endorsement: Breathing New Life into CGL Coverage for Pollution-Related
Offenses, 29 Gonz. L. Rev. 385 (1993-1994).
249. See Bruce W. Nelan, Formula for Terror: The Former Soviet Arsenal Is Leaking into the
West, Igniting Fears of a New Brand ofNuclear Horror, Time, Aug. 29, 1994., at 47, 47.
250. The U.S. Congress and state legislatures have acted to require disclosure of environmental
dangers in many cases. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1994); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 13:1K-6 (West 1991 &
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VIII. RECONCEPTUALIZING THE RULE
The likelihood is small that an attorney will encounter the nightmare
scenario hypothesized at the beginning of this Article. Thus, the choice
of the precise language stating the attorney's duty of confidentiality may
be symbolic." The legislative history of Rule 1.6 reports no debates of
divergent views regarding the line drawn in particular fact settings.252
Rather, the controversy centered on the "size of a discretionary zone"253
for attorney decision-making. The ABA debate revealed varying degrees
of aversion to the general concept of disclosure in the undefined,
theoretical case-unencumbered by facts. 4
The following discussion suggests a reassessment and
reconceptualization of Model Rule 1.6, to accord weight to both risks
inherent in the context of confidentiality (disclosure and silence). Four
suggestions spring from the analysis presented in the body of this Article
(though they require additional defense here): (1) the Rule must
acknowledge the power of positive law and of duties that are broader
than criminal law; (2) the exception should focus on the element of peril;
(3) a normative standard should be used to state a viable exception
endorsing attorney disclosure in circumstances of grave peril; and (4) the
confidentiality rule must state its standard with as much clarity as
possible.
A. Acknowledgment ofPositive Law
As it now stands, Rule 1.6 ignores positive law. It makes no reference
to the power of positive law (neither statutory mandates nor the common
law). Although there can be little doubt that positive law takes
precedence over the ethical rules, omitting mention of this fact impairs
Supp. 1996); 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6018.405 (West 1993); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 868-212-106,
868-212-213 (Michie 1996).
251. As is noted in the Legislative History of the February 1983 Mid-Year Meeting, "The Model
Code permitted a lawyer to reveal the intention of a client to commit any crime. There was no
evidence that this provision had interfered with lawyer-client communication." Legislative History,
supra note 13, at 49. Moreover, lawyers "only rarely have to choose between breaching a
professional code and maintaining a morally questionable silence." Zacharias, supra note 1, at 353.
252. It is likely that, given specific facts, attorneys and legal scholars would agree on whether
disclosure is necessary.
253. See I Hazard, Jr. & Hodes, supra note 34, § 1.6:302, at 168.47-.48 (Supp. 1996).
254. The divergent views may express competing perspectives regarding the competencies of
the decision makers on the front line of this issue (practicing attorneys). See id. at 168.47.
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the attorney's analysis and use of the Model Rules and may delay action
in situations of peril.
B. The Element of Peril
The exception for serious crimes is intended to protect the interest of
third parties and the public from unreasonable risk of harm. It presents
the break point at which the client's interest in secrecy is outweighed by
the ultimate right of each individual to be free from unreasonable risk
created by another. The exception for harm to another is based on the
concept that the client's interest must give way when the: countervailing
interest is so significant.
But Rule 1.6 skews the inquiry relating to the third party's interest. It
requires two elements: (1) significant peril to a third party (imminent
death or substantial bodily harm); and (2) culpable conduct by the client
(a criminal act). Only peril resulting from criminal conduct by the client
justifies disclosure. Thus, under Rule 1.6, the attorney has no right to
disclose a danger unless it is created by a criminal act.
Inclusion of the crime requirement in this test inserts a formalistic
requirement that lacks a nexus with the protective purpose of the
exception. It effectively blunts the test by diverting attention away from
the element of concern: peril. Fraudulent or negligent conduct can kill a
third party as readily as criminal conduct. Furthermore, negligent and
intentional torts include consideration of culpability. Criminal law does
not represent the full range of our responsibilities to one another.
Moreover, the element of crime inserts uncertainty into the analysis,
creating disparate results based not on how significant the harm to
another may be, but rather on the fortuity of whether the legislature has
foreseen the particular type of harm threatened and criminalized it.
A test for the exception that focuses on the peril to the third party
(substantial bodily harm or death) creates a balance that is appropriate to
the protected interest. It stops the reach of confidentiality "where the
public peril begins." 5 It allows the balancing of inte:rests consistent
with tort principles and social utility. "Although the reasons for vigilant
protection of client confidences are strong, these policy 'bases disappear
255. Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 347 (Cal. 1976). The peril in Tarasoff
was not "public peril" in the sense of dangers to the public at large, rather, the "public" aspect of
the peril arose from the cumulative interest of all persons in receiving the benefit of a warning. It
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when the client seeks, not representation with respect to past acts
(whether criminal or not), but rather to harm others in the future."256
In the case of a domestic-Bhopal, under Rule 1.6 an attorney must not
speak to prevent the harm if the peril arises from work practices that are
merely negligent rather than criminal. 7 Of course, warning the client
that the negligent acts are endangering others should be enough to
convince him to alter the work practices. Assuming that the client
persists in the same negligent practices, however, Rule 1.6 fails to
provide a basis for revealing the dangers. The negligence might be
deemed an intentional tort or may constitute reckless disregard, a basis
for punitive damages. In the absence of a statute criminalizing the
conduct, however, the reckless or intentional nature of the conduct does
not render the conduct criminal-a necessary element to justify
disclosure under the Rule. A similar result occurs with regard to fraud.
Thus, Rule 1.6 creates a disjunction between the rules of ethics and
common law duties."
C. The Needfor a Normative Standard
If the legal profession is to remain self-regulated, it must recognize
that, like other rights and duties, the duty of confidentiality is not an
absolute. It must give way to protection of others in rare circumstances
of peril. The ABA delegates, all lawyers of course, are accustomed to
negotiating for the most protective language and the widest latitude in
decision-making. Here, they designed a discretionary standard to
provide leeway for attorneys and protection to clients. However, the
standard fails to adequately assess the other interest in the balance: harm
to third parties. 9
256. Aronson, supra note 55, at 832.
257. Some environmental statutes do deem conduct criminal while recognizing that the conduct
would be merely negligent but for the statutory fiat. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7413(cX4) (1994)
(criminalizing negligent release of listed hazardous air pollutants).
258. Common law, the traditional source of rights and duties, recognizes that negligent conduct
is sufficiently culpable to support liability. The imposition of liability for negligence indicates a
system of justice in which duties to others in society are broader than the duty to refrain from
criminally proscribed conduct. See Steven D. Smith, The Critics and the "Crisis": A Reassessment
of Current Conceptions of Tort Law, 72 Comell L. Rev. 765 (1987) (noting tort law's goal of
enforcing social norms).
259. Pressing the scope of confidentiality to the extreme may add fuel to the public perception
that attorneys do not serve the goals of society. "We have seen too little evidence of professional as
opposed to trade performance by the individual lawyer and no evidence of serious professional
self-regulation toward diverting the profession to the pursuit of the common good-the public
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Only a normative standard can protect this interest by creating a
viable exception to the prohibition of Rule 1.6. The general rule stated in
Rule 1.6 is mandatory. It prohibits disclosure. "A lawyer shall not reveal
information relating to representation .... ,,2  The normative message
that the lawyer must not disclose client information is underscored by
numerous statements in the comments, the Preamble, and the Scope
statement.2 61 By contrast, the limited exception for preventing harm to
others is merely permissive: "A lawyer may reveal such information to
the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: (1) to prevent the
client from committing a criminal act . . ,262 The interaction of these
provisions, in conjunction with the momentum of the Rule discussed
above, results in an exception without substance.263 Social utility,
however, demands a viable exception to the mandate of silence in
extreme cases. This need can be seen most clearly in the context of
environmental catastrophes.
Environmental catastrophes overwhelm the analysis of the Rule when
the effect of a single hazardous event has imminent and dramatic
destructive power." Nuclear destruction and Bhopal-type disasters
necessitate a normative standard. Like the benefit ascribed to the
principle of confidentiality, their detriment is cumulatie.265 However,
unlike the benefits, the cost of the detriment is far from theoretical.
Given a high level of certainty that the disaster will occur absent
preemptive action, the need to speak should trump the putative benefit of
future attorney counseling. Hence, Rule 1.6 should employ a normative
standard to encourage attorneys to avert harm in extreme cases.
interest." F. Raymond Marks et al., The Lmvyer, The Public, and Professional Responsibility 288
(1972) (charging profession with failing to provide pro bono services to needy).
260. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (1994) (emphasis added).
261. See, e.g., Model Rules of Professional Conduct pmbl. para. 7 (1994); Model Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 cmts. 3, 12, 13.
262. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (emphasis added).
263. The use of a discretionary standard makes sense in a system where the attorney has
significant discretion. Permissive disclosure rules have been praised as "afford[ing] lawyers
latitude to deal with very difficult and often highly fact specific problems." Levin, supra note 178,
at 101. This benefit can only occur, however, in a system that provides latitude for the attorney's
decision.
264. "We now have a new environmental hazard to live with. We have a unique event here that
could only happen in the chemical age." Lee Clarke, Acceptable Risk?: Mcldng Decisions in a
Toxic Environment I (1989) (quoting local health officer).
265. This summary assumes the validity of the cumulative future benefits of Rule 1.6 promised
by the ABA's analysis.
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D. The Need for a Clear Statement
Difficult judgment calls inhere in situations of peril. To maximize the
likelihood of responsible judgments, the rule on confidentiality should
provide useful guidelines for balancing the interests at issue rather than
creating barriers to analysis. Rather than seeking to funnel the attorney's
analysis to a conclusion or to insulate the attorney from judicial review,
the Rule should incorporate the concepts of harm and risk developed by
tort law. Indeterminacy will always be present. A normative standard
declaring that the attorney "should" disclose a threat of imminent peril
will not make the balancing process described by Rule 1.6 easy, but it
will make it a genuine balancing process rather than a conclusion
masquerading as an inquiry.
E. Suggested Language
The following language attempts to incorporate the principles
discussed in this Article into the format of Rule 1.6:
(b) A lawyer shall reveal such information to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary to comply with law or the order of a
court.
(c) A lawyer should reveal such information to the extent the
lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent the client from
creating peril to another or others that is likely to result in death or
substantial bodily harm.
(d) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary to establish a claim or defense on
behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the
client, to establish a defense to a criminal change or civil claim
against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was
involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning
the lawyer's representation of the client.
The first exception's use of "must" with regard to other law is simply
an acknowledgment of the "forced exception '2 66 required by positive
law. "[A] lawyer who is merely permitted to reveal must reveal when
266. Hazard, Jr., supra note 40, at 1280 (using term more narrowly to describe situation in
which attorney must "make some kind of self-protective disclosure" when client refuses to rectify
fraud).
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faced with a mandatory requirement of 'other' law."267 The use of
"should" in subsection (c) vests discretion in the decision maker (the
attorney) in the case of possible peril. Under the Model Rules, this
discretionary standard would provide no basis for disciplinary action.26
But a mandatory rule with its threat of disciplinary action probably is not
necessary to achieve the goal of encouraging disclosure of peril.269
Moreover, a mandatory disclosure requirement would constrain the
judgment of the attorney in an area where judgment is paramount.20
With regard to the exception for attorney self-interest, the use of an
openly permissive standard (signaled by the use of "may") is sufficient
to protect the attorney decision-maker.27
IX. CONCLUSION
Rule 1.6 is radically out of step with the realities of the modem
world, including the real risk of environmental hazards. The philosophy
of Rule 1.6 rests on two foundational assumptions about the attorney's
role in society: first, that the transcendent benefits attending attorney
confidentiality (full representation and counseling compliance with the
law) outweigh the harms occasioned by silence; and second, that, as
professionals, attorneys must prefer client interests over the interests of
others. The modem potential for catastrophic harm challenges these
assumptions. Certainly changes in social attitudes, political mandates,
and physical threats have always required- reevaluation of legal
principles. Yet no change has presented so dramatic a need for
267. 2 HazardJr. & Hodes, supra note 34, § AP4:l06, at 1266. "Legal principles outside the
code thus convert 'may reveal' into 'must reveal."' Hodes, supra note 129, at 760.
268. The Scope section of the Model Rules notes that disciplinary action should not be taken for
actions within the bounds of attorney discretion. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Scope
para. 13 (1994). The Scope section clarifies this principle by stating: "Many of the Comments use
the term 'should.' Comments do not add obligations to the Rules . Model Rules of
Professional Conduct Scope para. 13.
269. "So long as lawyers are not prohibited from revealing the threat, moral duty will ordinarily
convert 'may reveal' into 'must reveal."' 2 Hazard, Jr. & Hodes, supra note 34, § AP4:104, at 1262
(Supp. 1994).
270. "[A]lthough some exceptions to absolute confidentiality are necessary, lawyers need not
invoke them at the first opportunity. To the contrary, each lawyer should strive to observe the spirit
of the general rule, and invoke an exception only when and to the extent it is truly necessary to do
so." See 1 Hazard, Jr. & Hodes, supra note 34, § 1.6:109, at 168.2 (Supp. 1996).
271. The latest statement of the American Law Institute's standard for the lawyer's duty of
confidentiality is set forth in Proposed Final Draft No. I of Restatement (Third) of Law Governing
Lawyers. It allows attorneys to disclose information necessary for a claim or d-.fense but rejects the
other instances of attorney self-interest. Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers § I 17A
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996).
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reevaluation as the advent of the destructive and hazardous forces now
present in the modem world. Through legislation, both the federal and
state governments have responded to the existence of nuclear, chemical,
and other environmental hazards. The compelling interests that
motivated these changes also justify reassessment of the legal
profession's ethical rules, including Model Rule 1.6.
Despite its apparent conformity to the paradigm of general rule and
exception, Rule 1.6 moves toward a categorical mandate of silence. Its
flat prohibition joins with constrained exceptions and cautionary
comments to produce a rule in which disclosure is never encouraged and
hardly ever allowed. The momentum of the Rule does more than guide
the attorney's professional judgment through basic principles. 2 It leads
(or drives) the attorney inexorably toward the decision to remain silent,
revealing both the strength of the Rule's preference for confidentiality
and a lack of faith in the decision-maker (the practicing attorney).
Although attorneys often address dangers created by clients through
moral dialogue with the client,2' such moral dialogue may fail to
alleviate dangers in the exceptional case. In such a case, the ethical rules
of the profession should provide useful guidance to the attorney and
should encourage real consideration of the threats presented by client
conduct. As protection against improvident disclosure, Rule 1.6 should
retain its strong prohibition against disclosure of client information. To
protect against the corollary danger of improvident silence, the rule
should provide a narrow but viable exception, encouraging attorneys to
assess dangers to non-clients and to disclose information when such
disclosure is necessary to prevent grave harm.
272. This language is drawn from paragraph eight of the Preamble to the Model Rules.
273. Cf Pepper, supra note 113, at 1609 (arguing that lawyer has "a presumptive moral
obligation to engage in a counseling conversation if there is reason to foresee that the client may
violate the law or a significant legal or moral norm").

